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This dissertation tackles the concept of market efficiency from three distinct 
topics in applied economics, from microfinance, to agriculture commodity market, and 
further to market microstructure of the most advanced economy.   
The first essay, entitled “Market Efficiency and Price Discovery Among Leading 
Rice Exporting Countries”, focuses on the issue of rice market efficiency.  The study 
establishes, under Johansen’s procedure, that there are long-run price co-movements 
existing among the three major rice-exporting countries, and within the United States 
domestic markets, the long-run efficient linkage between spot and future prices of 
rough rice, as Chicago Board of Trade rough rice futures converge to United States 
Department of Agriculture rough rice prices in a cash market.  Regarding the 
efficiency among the export market prices, results show that the hypothesis of market 
efficiency are rejected in two of the three pairs, namely Thai-Vietnam and Thai-
US(Arkansas).  The Gonzalo & Granger (1995) decomposition method finds that the 
Thai and United States rice are dominant in the price discovery process.  Within the 
United States domestic markets, the dominant is the futures market followed by the 
cash market of the rough rice and then the milled rice export price.   
The second essay, entitled “Determinants for Formal Credit and Informal Credit 
Access: The Case of Thai Farm Households”, examines determinants for Thai 
agricultural households’ participation in formal and its informal parallel credit 
  
markets.  The study follows Heckman’s two-stage selection model (1979) approach to 
determine the informal loan participation of Thai agricultural households.  Results 
reveal that households tend to ‘stick’ to the credit market in which they were 
previously engaged.  This finding reinforces the vicious cycle which makes it more 
difficult for farmers to get out of debt.  Secondly, the study finds that wealthier 
households are less likely to access credit, and are more likely to participate in formal 
credits than their less wealthy peers.   Results also show less probability of credit 
access between May and December coinciding with the planting and harvesting season 
accentuating the nature of loans as working-capital rather than consumption loans.  
Finally, the study discovers that households with owned farmland are more likely to 
participate in the formal credit market, while households with rented farmland are 
more likely to participate in the informal credit market stressing the use of owned land 
as collateral to participate in the former.   
The final essay, entitled “On the Challenge of Testing Weak-Form Market 
Efficiency using High Frequency Data”, explores the issue of efficiency in 
microstructure of the Exchange-Traded-Fund (ETF).  This essay shows that the 
profitability of a simple technical trading strategy hinges heavily on the way the 
Trades And Quotes (TAQ) dataset is filtered for mistakes and outliers. This paper uses 
ultra-high-frequency TAQ data that cover the time-span since the inception of the 
S&P 500 ETF from January 1993 to December 2006. First, a widely used filtering 
methodology proposed by Hasbrouck (2003) is adopted. Under this methodology, the 
technical trading strategy clearly outperforms the buy-and-hold benchmark. However, 
when a more appropriate (stringent) filtering methodology is used, the technical 
trading strategy clearly underperforms the buy-and-hold benchmark. This evidence 
suggests that studies that based their methodology on Hasbrouck’s (2003) less 
stringent filtering criterion could produce misleading results.  
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
 
This dissertation tackles the concept of market efficiency under three distinct 
topics in applied economics: microfinance, the agricultural commodity market, and 
market microstructure of the most advanced economy.   
 
The first essay, entitled “Market Efficiency and Price Discovery Among Leading 
Rice Exporting Countries”, focuses on the issue of rice market efficiency.  The 
international rice market is best characterized as a segmented market with imperfect 
substitution.  The existence of non-competitive pricing and absence of a centralized 
trading system allows countries with market power to exert a degree of price 
leadership.  The key to understanding the behavior of the rice market, hence, lies with 
an ability to assess the degree of price discovery among main participants.  To this 
end, the study sets up two main objectives.  First it seeks to establish, under 
Johansen’s procedure, that there are linkages, represented by price transmission 
elasticity, where price innovations from one market transmit to another among the top 
three rice exporting countries, namely Thailand, Vietnam, and the United 
States(Arkansas market), and, within the United States domestic markets, including 
the Chicago agricultural futures market.  Secondly, it will utilize the Gonzalo & 
Granger decomposition method to uncover long-run price discovery among each pair 
of markets.   
Consequently, through three bivariate cointegrated systems, the study shows that 
long-run price co-movements exist among the three major rice-exporting countries.  
In addition to this finding, the hypothesis of market efficiency, captured by the price 
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transmission elasticity, is rejected in two of the three pairs, namely Thai-Vietnam and 
Thai-US (Arkansas).  The magnitudes of the estimated price transmission elasticities 
reveal that Thai rice price shows higher acceleration in the long-run co-movement 
than that of US (Arkansas) and Vietnamese rice.  To examine this further, the 
Gonzalo & Granger common factor decomposition technique finds that the Thai rice 
price is a dominant force in the price discovery process among the three.  This finding 
is sensible as Thailand is the world’s largest rice exporter. 
 To evaluate the performance of the United State Department of Agriculture 
(USDA) adjusted world price relative to other major rice exporting countries, this 
study looks for evidence of long-run relationship of the adjusted world price with 
Thailand, Vietnam, and United States (Arkansas).  In this regard, the USDA adjusted 
world price shows only a long-run linkage with Vietnamese market.  The size of the 
estimated coefficient far from 1 also pinpoints that there could be other factors 
influencing the USDA world price.  This, combined with the fact that there is a failure 
to establish long-run price relationships between the USDA world rice price with the 
other two leading rice exporting markets, underscores a weakened argument to 
support validity and transparency of the USDA’s methodology.  This conclusion 
reinforces Taylor, Bessler, Waller, and Rister’s (1996)’s skepticism that other 
considerations besides market force are in place for formulation of the USDA 
adjusted world price. 
 For the US domestic rice markets, this study finds the efficient linkage 
between spot and future prices of rough rice, as the Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT) 
rough rice futures converge to USDA rough rice prices in a cash market.  In the 
vertical markets, the result also reveals the significant price linkage between two 
marketing levels of rough and milled rice in the United States.  Building on these 
linkages, the Gonzalo & Granger’s decomposition characterizes the dominant source 
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of the price discovery process in the futures market followed by the cash market of 
the rough rice and then the milled rice export price.   
 
The second essay, entitled “Determinants for Formal Credit and Informal Credit 
Access: The Case of Thai Farm Households”, examines determinants for Thai 
agricultural households’ participation in formal and informal credit markets.  
Understanding the workings of the parallel market is key to boosting the efficiency of 
the formal credit channel.  Using the 2006 Socio-Economic Household Survey of 
Thailand, the study follows Heckman’s two-stage selection model approach to 
determine the informal loan participation of Thai agricultural households.  Since one 
can observe the behavior of formal and informal credit participants only if they 
participate in new loans, one might view this pool of samples as self-selected.  The 
dire consequence of self-selection bias is first illuminated in Heckman (1979).  To 
demonstrate within this context, unobservable variables such as business acumen may 
affect both the probability of success in obtaining credit as well as probability of 
success in participating in formal loan.  Higher levels of business acumen lead to 
higher success in obtaining credit, and thus successful borrowers are likely to have 
higher levels of business acumen than non-borrowers.  As a consequence of this, the 
probability of success in obtaining formal credit is overestimated from the influence 
of selected samples.  Hence, excluding the selection stage to engage in new loans 
from the full estimation induces a selection bias due to a non-random sample.  See 
Achen (1986) and Sartori (2003) for more discussion of selection bias.  
Results from the two-stage selection model provide supporting evidence that, 
facing credit rationing, households are more likely to ‘stick’ to the credit market they 
were previously engaged, whether the formal or informal credit market.  This finding 
reinforces the vicious cycle which makes it more difficult for farmers to get out of 
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debt.  Secondly, the study finds supporting evidence that wealthier households are less 
likely to access credit, but, if they do, they are more likely to participate in formal 
credits, and the opposite is true of less wealthy households.   Thirdly, the study finds 
supporting evidence for less credit participation during May and December coinciding 
with the planting and harvesting season.   Specifically, the probability for accessing 
new credit starts off high in the beginning of the year then slowly declines while 
participation in informal credit, conditional on participating in new credit, rises 
toward the end of the year.  Alarmingly, this indicates that, while overall access to 
new credit declines, people who need credit tend to participate in informal credit more 
as months pass.  This piece of evidence pinpoints the limited role of Bank for 
Agriculture and Agricultural Co-operatives (BAAC) in providing working capital 
only and not consumption-based loans underlining the importance of the lack of 
formal credit facility for farmers, and should be addressed quickly.  Finally, the model 
finds that households with owned farmland are more likely to participate in the formal 
credit market, while households with rented farmland are more likely to participate in 
the informal credit market stressing the use of owned land as collateral to participate 
in formal credit channels.   
 
The final essay, entitled “On the Challenge of Testing Weak-Form Market 
Efficiency using High Frequency Data” reveals that inherent data errors and mistakes 
in high frequency Trades And Quotes (TAQ) data complicate microstructure research.  
It demonstrates that the profitability of a simple technical trading algorithm hinges 
heavily on the way the TAQ dataset is filtered for mistakes and outliers.  Hasbrouck’s 
(2003) technique of the 50 cent filter is insufficient to remove outliers that could 
potentially misguide the result on microstructure research.  Using high frequency 
price data for 1993-2006 from the S&P 500 ETF, this paper shows that by running a 
  5 
simple trading algorithm on price after the Hasbrouck’s filter has been applied, excess 
returns above those from the buy-and-hold strategy are large, significant, and robust.  
However, when a more appropriate (stringent) filtering treatment is used, the same 
algorithm clearly underperforms the buy-and-hold benchmark. It is clear from this 
analysis that Hasbrouck’s (2003) filter allows many erroneous prices to remain in the 
data and therefore biases the profitability of the technical trading strategy.  This study 
also recommends a more appropriate filter level of 0.1% as a mean to clean this 
specific dataset.  Finally, these results demonstrate that testing weak form efficiency 
of high frequency stock prices cannot be done until the issue of appropriate filtering is 
completely resolved.  
  6 
CHAPTER TWO 
MARKET EFFICIENCY AND PRICE DISCOVERY AMONG LEADING RICE-
EXPORTING COUNTRIES 
1 INTRODUCTION 
Rice is one of the most common commodities in global agricultural trade.  In 
2009, the USDA estimated that rice is critical to the diet of half of the global 
population.  It also observed that countries with lower income per capita tend to spend 
a higher percentage of income on food, and a greater amount of caloric intake comes 
from rice.  As income rises, per capita rice consumption declines and is replaced with 
increasing meat and dairy consumption (see Childs & Kiawu, 2009).  This long term 
growth trend facilitates the view that stable global rice production is crucial to the 
welfare of low income populations.  The challenge, however, lies within the market’s 
infrastructure to bring the surplus of rice produced to international trade.  Given the 
present low trade volume of rice compared to global production volume, the rice 
market is considered thin (see Slayton, 2009). Two major concerns arose; first the 
thinness of the rice market could potentially allow international rice prices to be 
determined by only a few major players.  And secondly relying on this thin market the 
capacity of a rice exporting country to meet demand from rice importing countries 
becomes even more critical.  Given the recent rice price peak, in early 2008, 
following government mandates for export restrictions, the question of steady supply 
of rice and dietary welfare of people at the margins becomes even more essential. 
 
Before one can formulate a policy relevant to rice trade, the first task would be to 
understand the unique structure of the global rice trade and importance of linkages 
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among major players.  Accordingly, this study aims to understand the price behavior 
of key rice exporting countries, and once the linkages between rice exporting 
countries are established, to test whether each pair of markets is efficient.  Secondly 
this study aims to measure the degree of price leadership through price discovery 
decomposition, specifically each market’s long-term contribution to the permanent 
value of rice.  This contribution of price discovery is the key to understanding the 
organizational behavior of the rice market as it assesses the degree of price leadership 
among its main participants. 
 
To this end, the paper sets up two main objectives.  First it seeks to establish, 
under Johansen’s procedure, that there are linkages, represented by price transmission 
elasticity, where price innovations from one market transmit to another among the top 
three rice exporting countries, namely Thailand, Vietnam, and the United 
States(Arkansas market), and, within the United States domestic markets, including 
the Chicago agricultural futures market.  Secondly, it utilizes the Gonzalo & Granger 
decomposition method to uncover long-run price discovery among each pair of 
markets.  The possibility of linking the Chicago futures market with leading exporters 
is also considered, but a framework to directly compare the two seems lacking, since 
the Chicago future market trades rice futures in rough form while Thailand and 
Vietnam only export rice in milled form.  
 
This paper follows a bivariate approach in time series in contrast to a multivariate 
approach due to a limited ability of the latter to identify and interpret coefficients 
involving market efficiency for a system larger than two markets (see Barret, 2001, 
Fackler & Goodwin, 2001).  Consequently, through three bivariate cointegrated 
systems, this study shows that long-run price co-movements exist among the three 
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major rice-exporting countries.  In addition to this finding, the hypothesis of market 
efficiency, captured by the price transmission elasticity, are rejected in two of the 
three pairs, namely Thai-Vietnam and Thai-US (Arkansas).  The magnitudes of the 
estimated price transmission elasticities reveal that the Thai rice price is more volatile 
in the long-run co-movement than that of US (Arkansas) and Vietnamese rice.  To 
examine further, the Gonzalo & Granger common factor decomposition technique 
finds that the Thai rice price is a dominant force in the price discovery process, along 
with the United States. This finding is sensible as Thailand is the world’s largest rice 
exporter while the United States dominates high-quality rice and high-income 
markets.   
 
To evaluate the performance of the USDA adjusted world price relative to other 
major rice exporting countries, this study looks for evidence of a long-run relationship 
of the adjusted world price with Thailand, Vietnam, and United States (Arkansas).  In 
this regard, the USDA adjusted world price shows only a long-run linkage with the  
Vietnamese market.  The size of the estimated coefficient, being far from 1, also 
pinpoints that there could be other factors influencing the USDA world price.  In 
combination with the fact that we fail to establish long-run price relationships 
between the USDA world rice price with the other two leading rice exporting markets, 
underscores a weakened ground to support validity and transparency of the USDA’s 
methodology.  This conclusion reinforces Taylor, Bessler, Waller, and Rister’s 
(1996)’s skepticism that other considerations besides market force are in place for 
formulation of the USDA adjusted world price. 
 
 For the US domestic rice markets, this study finds the efficient linkage 
between spot and future prices of rough rice, as the Chicago Board of Trade rough 
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rice futures converge to USDA rough rice prices in a cash market as the price 
transmission elasticity does not statistically differ from 1.   In the vertical markets, the 
result also reveals the significant price linkage between two marketing level of rough 
and milled rice in the United States.  Building on these linkages, the Gonzalo & 
Granger’s decomposition characterizes the dominant source of the price discovery 
process in the futures market followed by the cash market of the rough rice and then 
the milled rice export price.   
 
For the remainder of the paper, Section 1 introduces and provides the 
background for rice markets.  Section 2 provides a survey of literature on spatial 
markets.  Section 3 briefly visits the main hypotheses.  Section 4 discusses empirical 
strategy.  Section 5 discusses sources and time series properties of the data.  Results 
are given in section 6.  Section 7 presents policy implications, and Section 8 
concludes the paper. 
 
1.1 CHARACTERISTICS OF RICE MARKETS 
This section provides brief background on rice markets, including a global 
supply perspective, consumption, and characteristics that define the international rice 
market. 
 
1.1.1 Global supply and consumption 
Global rice production has increased steadily due to both expansion of 
harvesting areas and yield improvement through technology and modern irrigation 
systems.  According to the USDA grain database, the global harvesting area slowly 
increased from 147 million hectares in 1990/91 to over 160 million hectares in 
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2009/10, or a compound average growth rate of 0.43% over 20 years.  Yield 
improvement of rough rice also saw gradual increases from 3.54 metric tons per 
hectare in 1990/91 to 4.3 metric tons per hectare in 2009/10, or a compound average 
growth rate of 1.03%.  Milled rice production increased to 459 million tons in 
2009/10 from 353 million tons in 1990/91, or a compound average growth rate of 
1.36%.  Over the same period, rice consumption also rose to 449 million tons from 
351 million tons, or a compound average growth rate of 1.31%.   Faster production 
growth allows excess rice production each year to be accumulated for next year’s 
stocks.   
 
1.1.2 Global rice stock-to-use ratio 
The gauge to monitor the health of available rice supply is the stock-to-use 
ratio (figure 3).  This ratio compares beginning stock to a year’s consumption.  While 
a slight price decrease during 1997 and 2000 corresponded with the general increase 
in global stock, and a price increase from 2001 to 2005 corresponded with the 
decrease in global stock of the same period, the peak in 2008 is not associated with a 
meaningful decrease in global rice stock.  This poses a serious issue concerning the 
rice market infrastructure as a means to allocate rice efficiently.   
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Figure 1 Area Harvested and Rough Rice Yield (rough basis) 
Source: USDA Estimates. Foreign Agricultural Service. Author’s calculation. 
 
Figure 2 Rice Stocks and Consumption(milled basis) 
Source: USDA Estimates. Foreign Agricultural Service. Author’s calculation. 
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Figure 3 World Rice Ending Stocks and  Stock-to-Use Ratio (milled basis) 
Source: USDA Estimates. Foreign Agricultural Service. Author’s calculation. 
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Figure 4 Milled Rice Prices (Unit in US$/Metric Ton) 
Source: USDA Rice briefing room. 
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Table 1 Milled rice production by country (Unit in Thousand Metric Tons) 
Production 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010* 
China 127200 130224 134330 137000 137500 
India 93350 96690 99180 87500 99000 
Indonesia 35300 37000 38300 38800 40000 
Bangladesh 29000 28800 31000 30500 32300 
Vietnam 22922 24375 24393 24380 24750 
Thailand 18250 19800 19850 20300 20600 
Burma 10600 10730 10150 10597 11000 
Philippines 9775 10479 10753 9757 10800 
Brazil 7695 8199 8569 7820 8400 
Japan 7786 7930 8029 7711 7850 
United States 6088 6149 6400 6917 7809 
Pakistan 5450 5700 6700 6500 6500 
Cambodia 3946 4238 4520 4780 4800 
Korea, South 4680 4408 4843 4916 4600 
Egypt 4383 4385 4402 4300 3900 
Nigeria 2900 3000 3200 3400 3600 
Nepal 2804 2810 2850 2900 2900 
Madagascar 2240 2304 2505 2688 2688 
Sri Lanka 2145 2200 2227 2566 2594 
Iran 1724 1850 1500 2000 2050 
Other 22117 22338 24326 25253 25638 
World Total 420355 433609 448027 440585 459279 
Source: USDA Estimates. Foreign Agricultural Service. 
*2010 number is USDA Forecast. 
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Table 2 Rice consumption by country (Unit in Thousand Metric Tons) 
Domestic 
Consumption 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010* 
China 127200 127450 133000 134500 135500 
India 86700 90466 91090 89300 93500 
Indonesia 35900 36350 37090 38100 39500 
Bangladesh 29764 30747 31000 31300 32500 
Vietnam 18775 19400 19000 19150 19500 
Philippines 12000 13499 13650 13614 13700 
Burma 10670 10249 9648 10000 10100 
Thailand 9780 9600 9500 9600 9800 
Brazil 7925 8254 8530 8600 8650 
Japan 8250 8177 8326 8200 8125 
Nigeria 4400 4500 5150 5300 5500 
Korea, South 4887 4670 4788 4750 4740 
United States 3959 3919 3957 4001 4050 
Cambodia 3646 3788 3770 3960 3970 
Egypt 3276 3340 4000 4000 3850 
Iran 3294 3297 3350 3400 3500 
EU-27 2911 3185 2925 3100 3150 
Pakistan 2207 2700 3400 3000 3000 
Nepal 2993 3016 2909 2912 2925 
Madagascar 2400 2499 2615 2838 2838 
Other 37159 37059 38171 39745 40892 
World Total 418096 426165 435869 439370 449290 
Source: USDA Estimates. Foreign Agricultural Service.  
*2010 number is USDA Forecast. 
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1.1.3 Rice as a differentiated product 
In terms of product differentiation, rice is categorized into four main types, 
namely Indica, Aromatic, Japonica, and Glutinous.  In 2009, long-grain Indica rice 
dominated global rice trade with a 75% share.  Long-grain Aromatic, such as Thai’s 
Jasmine and India’s Basmati, accounts for a 12%-13% share.  Short and medium 
Japonica accounts for around a 10% share of global trade.  Glutinous accounts for the 
small remainder.  The Aromatic rice usually sells at a premium to Indica to reflect 
demand from higher income countries.  Indica rice is popular in the Middle East, East 
and Southeast Asia, and Africa.   Japonica rice is preferred in East Asian countries, 
the Caribbean, and Eastern European (see Rice:Background, 2009, Bashir, 2002). 
 
1.1.4 Thin market 
Although rice is traded globally, rice trade is traditionally viewed as a “thin 
market” due to low trade volume compared to production volume.  This is an inherent 
characteristic of rice markets when compared to other commodity markets (see 
Siamwalla & Haykin, 1983, Slayton, 2009).  Compared to other commodities, in the 
2009/10 marketing year, the average volume of trade per production is only 7% for 
rice, compared to 19% for corn, and 28% for wheat (see figure 6).  Not only is the 
volume of rice trade thin, but only a few countries have export capacity to impact rice 
trade.   Table 1 shows that the largest rice producer in the world by volume is China, 
but the equally large share of domestic consumption leaves little to export (see Table 
2).  Indonesia and Bangladesh are a similar story.  Based on 2009/10 data, the top five 
exporting countries by volume are Thailand, Vietnam, Pakistan, the United States, 
and India (see Table 3).   Altogether, five countries export 81% of total international 
rice trade volume.  The fact that few players control so much trade volume makes a 
case of collusion seem plausible.  Nonetheless, studies of market power in the global 
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rice trade seem to suggest otherwise.  Karp & Perloff (1989) found that the oligopoly 
model fits well with the data, but that the degree of market power is low, and closer to 
competitive equilibrium than to collusion.  More recent literature, accounting for rice 
differentiation (Bashir, 2002), also found that modeling global rice in a Bertrand 
equilibrium model is the better representation compared to a collusion model,  as the 
conjecture variation suggests that market behavior is closer to competitive than 
collusive 1.  
 
A low degree of market power does not imply that the market functions 
efficiently.  A thin market by itself could pose a big challenge, since we have already 
witnessed that an abrupt change in tradable supply conditions could create an upswing 
of price volatility.  India’s export restrictions on non-basmati rice and Vietnam’s ban 
on rice exports to calm domestic food price pressure in 2008 coincided with triple-
fold increases in  international rice prices leading to a record-setting $1,000 U.S 
dollars in all major export markets, (see Appendix).  Surging rice prices will increase 
nations’ food price inflation, as they filter through to consumers.  
 
 
 
                                                 
1 Recall that the Bertrand equilibrium represents the case of low market power. For a perfectly 
substitute product with two players, both would use marginal cost pricing. 
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Figure 5 Volume of trade per production (based on weight) 
Source: Data from Foreign Agriculture Service and Author’s calculation. 
2.0%
7.0%
12.0%
17.0%
22.0%
27.0%
32.0%
37.0%
1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009
Rice, Milled Corn Wheat
  19 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3 Rice Exports ranked by country on a milled basis (Unit 
in Thousand Metric Tons) 
Exports 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010* 
Thailand 9557 10011 8570 9500 10000 
Vietnam 4522 4649 5950 5750 5800 
Pakistan 2839 3000 3000 3300 3600 
United States 2886 3305 3011 3303 3529 
India 5740 4654 2090 2200 2500 
China 1340 969 783 850 900 
Cambodia 450 500 800 850 850 
Uruguay 734 778 987 715 815 
Argentina 452 443 554 625 700 
Burma 31 541 1052 600 700 
Brazil 242 550 569 300 500 
Egypt 1203 750 550 600 300 
Guyana 250 210 210 250 250 
Japan 200 200 200 200 200 
EU-27 148 152 140 140 140 
Paraguay 67 79 125 163 127 
Russia 12 21 90 100 110 
Ecuador 161 90 15 40 100 
Peru 20 20 80 50 100 
Australia 166 36 15 40 65 
Other 435 253 273 241 197 
World Total 31455 31211 29064 29817 31483 
Source: USDA Estimates. Foreign Agricultural Service 
*2010 number is USDA Forecast. 
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Table 4 Rice Imports ranked by country on a milled basis (Unit in 
Thousand Metric Tons) 
Imports 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010* 
Philippines 1800 2570 2600 2200 2500 
Nigeria 1500 1800 1750 1800 1900 
Iran 1500 1550 1470 1300 1500 
EU-27 1340 1568 1339 1350 1350 
Iraq 613 975 1089 1100 1150 
Saudi Arabia 958 961 1166 1049 1100 
Malaysia 886 799 1039 1070 1020 
Cote d'Ivoire 920 845 800 860 900 
South Africa 795 1030 580 800 900 
Japan 675 597 656 700 700 
Senegal 675 820 683 700 700 
United States 653 759 610 635 667 
Brazil 732 422 675 950 650 
Mexico 594 582 588 600 650 
Cuba 574 652 463 565 550 
Vietnam 450 300 500 500 500 
Hong Kong 348 399 395 400 410 
Bangladesh 769 2047 602 90 400 
Guinea 230 175 150 330 375 
Mozambique 335 450 270 350 375 
Other 11883 10083 9734 9831 10370 
Unaccounted 3225 1827 1905 2637 2816 
World Total 31455 31211 29064 29817 31483 
Source: USDA Estimates. Foreign Agricultural Service. 
*2010 number is USDA Forecast. 
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1.2 COUNTRIES AND PRODUCTS 
This section begins with a brief background on the market destination of key 
exporting countries, concluding with the largest rice importing country, the 
Philippines.  Although the import side of the market is not considered in this research, 
a background on the Philippines as a key player can help the reader to understand the 
landscape of global rice trade. 
1.2.1 Thailand 
Thailand is the largest rice exporter in the world in terms of trade volume.  
Between 2005/06 and 2009/10, the USDA estimates that Thailand transferred around 
48% of its rice production to exports.  Based on information compiled from the Thai 
Rice Exporters Association (Statistics 2008, 2010), in 2008, Thailand shipped 25% of 
its exportable rice, around 10 million tons, to destinations in Asia, 46% to Africa, 
14% to the Middle East, 8% to Europe, 6% to the Americas, and 2% to Oceanic 
countries.  Thai rice export volume is comprised of 25% high quality rice, mostly 
long-grain Aromatic “Hom Mali Rice” or Thai Jasmine rice yet this generates about 
30% of export revenue, and 75% long-grain Indica white rice, making up 70% of 
export revenue.  Premium Thai Jasmine rice is popular in high income markets such 
as Hong Kong, Malaysia, Singapore, the United States, the EU, and the Middle East.  
Thai white rice finds markets in African countries, the Philippines, Indonesia, and 
China (see Prasertsri, 2009). 
 
1.2.2 Vietnam 
Vietnam is the second largest rice exporter in the world in terms of volume.  
From 2005/06 to 2009/10, the USDA estimates that Vietnam transferred 22% of its 
production to exports.  In 2008, Vietnam shipped 52% of its exportable 4.6 million 
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tons of long-grain Indica white rice to destinations in Asia, 27% to Africa, 5% to the 
Middle East, 3% to Europe, and 11% to the Americas.  The Vietnamese rice price is 
traditionally lower than that for Thai rice, making Vietnam rice popular among lower 
income markets, such as African countries, the Philippines, Malaysia, Bangladesh, 
and Cuba.  Vietnam also has a variant of fragrant rice, but the export volume of 
Vietnamese Jasmine rice is not significant to its share of total rice export volume (see 
Quan, 2009) 
 
1.2.3 United States2 
The United States is the fourth largest rice exporter in terms of volume, after 
Pakistan.  From 2005/06 to 2009/10, the USDA estimates that the United States 
transferred 48% of its production to exports.  The United States produces long-grain 
Indica, medium and short-grain Japonica rice with 60%, 35%, and 5% of weight-
production share respectively. Each southern states, namely Arkansas, Louisiana, 
Mississippi, Missouri, and Texas, produced between 11.7 and 86 million cwt of long-
grain rice in 2008/09, with Arkansas alone producing more than 50% of total long-
grain rice in the United States.  California is the largest state in terms of producing 
Japonica medium and short-grain rice, with a more than 80% share of total medium-
grain rice in the United States.  While the yield of the United States rice farmers is 
highest among top exporters (see figure 6), exports of United States milled rice have 
been slowly declining due to fierce price competition from lower cost Asian 
exporters.  Nonetheless, the decline in milled rice exports has been compensated for 
by the rise in exports of rough rice, which has allowed the United States to reduce its 
lost share of rice exports (see Childs & Burdett, 2000).  While Thailand and Vietnam 
only export rice in a milled-form, but in a rough rice arena, the United States is a 
                                                 
2Due to the limited data availability, India as the third largest rice exporter is excluded from the study. 
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dominant player.  Latin America countries prefer to import rough rice from the United 
States to utilize their excess milling capacities since few other countries allow exports 
of rough rice, and no other countries can export significance volume of rough rice to 
match that of the United States (see Cramer, Wailes, Chavez, & Hanzen, 1998).  
Since 1998, rough rice has accounted for more than 30% of the US rice export mix, 
with Mexico and Central America as top export destinations.  The United States was 
also able to export rough rice to Brazil, Ecuador, and Colombia when there was a 
need to boost the level of domestic stocks. 
 
In response to lower cost Asian rice producers, the Marketing Loan program, 
part of the Commodity Loan program3  was introduced for rice farmers in 1986 under 
provisions of the 1985 U.S. Farm Act.   The Rice Marketing Loan program was 
designed to offer two loan repayment levels, based on market price above or below an 
adjusted world price. When market price is above the adjusted world price, the normal 
loan rate comes into effect, and when market price is below the adjusted world price, 
the lower loan repayment rate kicks in.  Therefore, the benefits to U.S. rice farmers 
when market price is below the adjusted world price are 1) the difference between the 
loan rate and loan repayment, called a marketing loan gain, and 2) waiver of all 
accrued interest on the loan. (see Westcott & Price, 2001). 
 
Consequently, this program requires USDA to calculate the fair world price.  
While the core component of the adjusted world price reflects major milled rice prices 
in major export markets, the other component also includes the effects of supply-
                                                 
3 Commodity loans may be settled in three ways: 1)Repaying at the loan rate plus interest costs (CCC 
interest cost of borrowing from the U.S. Treasury plus 1 percentage point), 2)Repaying at an alternative 
loan repayment rate, or 3) Forfeiting the pledged crop to the CCC at loan maturity. 
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demand changes, government-assisted sales, and other relevant price indicators, 
which adds significant element of judgment into the world price formula (see 
Westcott & Price, 2001).  In this regard, Taylor, Bessler, Waller, and Rister (1996) 
argued that lack of transparency in the formula of the USDA adjusted world price 
makes it susceptible to error in judgment.   
 
1.2.4 Philippines  
The Philippines is the largest rice importer based on volume.  This is despite 
the fact that rice production in the Philippines ranked eighth in the world.  From 1995 
onward, the Philippines’ rice consumption continued outpacing domestic production 
increases.  From 2005/06 to 2009/10, the USDA estimates that the Philippines 
imported on average 17% of its consumption.   This crucial dependency on rice 
imports puts the Philippines at the top of list of rice importing countries, with an 8% 
share of the total international rice trade.  Being the largest rice buyer in the 
international market, the Philippines regularly purchases rice through auctions or a 
government to government (G to G) tender offer.  The rice auction operation is 
carried out by the rice bidding committee at the National Food Authority (NFA).  The 
rice stock level of Philippines is closely watched by rice traders as an indicator of the 
probability of imminent rice imports which would significantly affect international 
rice prices. 
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Figure 6 Rice Yield (rough basis) metric ton per hectare 
Source: Data from the Foreign Agriculture Service and Author’s calculation. 
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1.3.2 Genetically Modified rice 
Presently, only the United States, Canada, Argentina, China and Brazil allow the 
widespread planting and commerce of the Genetically Modified (GM) rice.  There is 
also speculation that the Philippines, India, and Bangladesh might soon follow China 
in accepting GM rice in Asia (see Serapio, 2010).  Thailand remains cautious about 
GM rice and has completely banned GM rice research.  Vietnam allowed GM rice 
research in 2001, but restricted it to laboratory-stage only (see Rice, 2010). 
 
Proponents of GM rice argue that the GM rice improves yields and can solve 
malnutrition problems for the world’s population (see The Golden Rice Project, 
2010).  Opponents argue that, with GM rice, there could be a hidden harmful 
component that, once unleashed in wide-scale planting, would be irreversible (see 
Hands Off Our Rice, 2010).  Resistance from Europe and Middle Eastern countries 
toward GM rice will limit its growth in these high income markets.  Despite this 
setback, GM rice continues to grow in lower income countries where malnutrition 
problems are greater (see Genetically Modified Rice, 2008). 
 
2 SURVEY OF LITERATURE ON SPATIAL MARKET EFFICIENCY 
This section describes a brief history of cointegration in a spatial market in the 
literature and ends with a definition of market efficiency.  Based on the pioneering 
work of Engle and Granger (1987) on the concept of cointegration, which 
demonstrates that non-stationary variables are cointegrated if there exists a linear 
combination among them that is stationary,  cointegration analysis finds popular use 
in many applications that seek the long-term equilibrium in dynamic settings, such as 
studies of securities price (see Hasbrouck, 2003), as well as convergence of prices in 
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the future and the cash market (see Figuerola-Ferretti and Gonzalo, 2008).  The 
cointegration concept also finds application in spatial market studies, in which its 
common use is to test the hypothesis of the Law of One Price in a spatial setting and 
to measure the degree of ‘integration’ or ‘efficiency’ (see Fackler and Goodwin, 2001 
for more discussion). 
 
Criticism of cointegration analysis spatial markets sees the test of market 
efficiency as indistinguishable from tests of the assumption underlying the model 
itself.  In essence, the rejection of the model does not imply inefficiency of spatial 
markets, but may imply flawed assumptions underlying the error-correction model 
instead (see McNew and Fackler, 1997, Barrett, 2001).  However, evidence for the 
efficient role of markets continues to emerge.  Dawson and Dey (2002) analyzed rice 
market pairs in Bangladesh using an error-correction model and found results 
supportive of market integration. Rashid (2004) employed the same framework to 
analyze maize in Uganda and found evidence in favor of market efficiency. 
Thompson, Sul, and Bohl (2002) used the Seemingly Unrelated Regression error-
correction model on wheat markets in the UK, France, and Germany and found 
evidence that conformed to the law of one price as well as efficient markets. 
 
While earlier spatial market literature implies that price cointegration is evidence 
of market integration, Barrett (2001) argued that cointegration analysis based on price 
information alone cannot be used to infer market integration, that, in the absence of 
trade flow information, a price-based notion of market equilibrium or price 
cointegration can only suggest market efficiency.  According to his definition, market 
efficiency is “the satisfaction of zero marginal benefit equilibrium conditions. It is 
therefore a statement about welfare, about whether there exist potential Pareto 
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improvements in the (international) economy”.  In this sense, the market is highly 
efficient when there are few or no Pareto improvement opportunities. 
 
The definition of market efficiency among rice-exporting countries in this study 
is based on observations of co-movement of the price in the cointegrating equation, 
specifically the price transmission elasticity.  To the extent that two spatial prices 
show tight co-movement, that price shocks from one market are able to transmit to the 
other market efficiently, the windows to arbitrage would be minimal, and we can infer 
high efficiency between the two markets.    In contrast, if two spatial prices 
demonstrate diverging trends, then it would suggest a possible Pareto improvement 
opportunity, and an indication of a low level of market efficiency as well as evidence 
in favor of market segmentation.  
 
On a more cautious note, since this framework heavily relies on price 
information, but the lack of transportation and transaction costs, and more 
importantly, trade flow and the effect of domestic policies which can often be 
unpredictable, and difficult to distinguish, it is prudent that the interpretation of the 
estimated co-movement must be taken with consideration of these factors as well.  
 
Finally, the main contributions of this paper are twofold.  First, to the best of my 
knowledge, this is the first time the price discovery concept has been addressed in the 
context of the global rice trade.  Secondly, policymakers often lack tools to gauge the 
impact of international rice price adjustment.  The estimated price transmission 
elasticities from this research provide a preliminary assessment tool to both market 
participants and any governmental supervisory body. 
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3 HYPOTHESES 
This section formalizes the questions this study attempts to answer.  
 
Hypothesis 1: There exists an efficient long-run price relationship among the Thai, 
Vietnamese, and US rice export market. 
The first hypothesis considers whether there exists a long-run price relationship 
among Thai, Vietnamese, and US (Arkansas) rice, and conditional on the existence of 
the linkages, the hypothesis of efficient market will be tested.  The existence of a 
long-run price relationship is a prerequisite to Gonzalo and Granger decomposition 
which measures the degree of price discovery in each pair of markets (see Gonzalo 
and Granger, 1995).  In contrast, if the existence of a long-run price relationship 
cannot be determined, one plausible explanation is a high degree of market 
segmentation, and that market-specific factors play a more dominant role in 
determining price movement within each markets. 
 
Hypothesis 2:  The USDA adjusted world price reflects a long-run price relationship 
with Thai, Vietnamese, and US rice. 
This hypothesis considers whether the performance of the USDA world price 
truly reflects the actual rice prices in leading rice exporting countries.  The 
verification of a long-run price relationship between the USDA adjusted world price 
and prices for other major rice exporting countries will ease policy observers’ fear of 
USDA price manipulation through Marketing Loan Program and provides empirical 
justification to enhance its program’s transparency (see discussions in Taylor, Bessler, 
Waller, and Rister, 1996). 
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Hypothesis 3: There exists a convergence between spot and future markets of rough 
rice in the US market. 
The third hypothesis considers whether there exists an efficient long-run price 
relationship between cash and future markets for rough rice in US rice markets.  
Similar to the first hypothesis, the existence of a long-run price relationship is a 
precondition for market efficiency test.  In the context of future and spot price, market 
efficiency implies that future market mechanism functions as a source of price 
discovery and that two prices converge in the long run.  Conversely, if the result fails 
to comply with this prediction, the market mechanism maybe inefficient and its 
function should be examined further. 
  
Hypothesis 4: There exists a long-run price relationship between U.S. rough and 
milled rice. 
The final hypothesis considers whether there exists a price linkage between two 
marketing levels, rough and milled rice respectively. A proof of a cointegration 
signifies a price transmission channel in which price innovation travel from one to 
another marketing level.  Conditional on the valid cointegration, the price discovery 
measurement reveals the source of information flow between the two marketing 
levels. 
 
4 EMPIRICAL STRATEGY 
The section describes the construction of stationary time series model and 
relevant statistical tests.  
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4.1 UNIT ROOT TESTS 
Stationarity of variables is the most important concern in modern time series 
estimation. To determine if price and first differences are stationary I(0).  In this 
study, the modified augmented Dicky-Fuller test (MADF) is considered instead of the 
augmented Dicky-Fuller (ADF). In essence, the MADF test applies the 
implementation of the ADF test on the price series that is transformed by a 
generalized least squares regression.  The MADF test demonstrates greater power and 
more consistent results than the standard Augmented Dicky-Fuller (ADF) in rejecting 
the null hypothesis of unit root (see Elliott, Rothenberg, and Stock, 1996).  The 
method for selecting lag is the minimum Schwarz information criterion (SIC). 
 
 
4.2 ERROR CORECTION SPECIFICATION 
Consider a price evolution in a vector autoregressive form 
 
 𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡 = 𝑣𝑣 + 𝐴𝐴1𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝐴𝐴2𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡−2 + ⋯+ 𝐴𝐴𝑝𝑝𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡−𝑝𝑝 + 𝜀𝜀𝑡𝑡  (1) 
 𝑡𝑡 = 1, … ,𝑇𝑇 
 
where 𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡  is a 𝐾𝐾 × 1 vector of the logarithm of rice prices. 𝑣𝑣 is a 𝐾𝐾 × 1 vector 
of constants, 𝐴𝐴1 …𝐴𝐴𝑝𝑝  are 𝐾𝐾 × 𝐾𝐾 matrices of parameters.  And 𝜀𝜀𝑡𝑡  is a 𝐾𝐾 × 1 vector of 
error terms.  𝜀𝜀𝑡𝑡  has zero mean and variance-covariance matrix Σ, and is i.i.d.  𝐾𝐾 is the 
number of markets in the consideration.  
 
Rewriting (1) in an error correction representation yields the following 
  
 ∆𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡 = 𝜐𝜐 + Π𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡−1 + ∑ Γ𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝−1𝑖𝑖=1 Δ𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡−𝑖𝑖 + 𝜖𝜖𝑡𝑡  (2) 
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 𝑡𝑡 = 1, … ,𝑇𝑇 
 where Π = ∑ Aj − Ipj=pj=1 and Γi = −∑ Ajj=pj=i+1 . 
 
Γ𝑖𝑖  are 𝐾𝐾 × 𝐾𝐾 parameter matrices which contain short-run dynamics with Δ𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡−𝑖𝑖 . 
Π is a 𝐾𝐾 × 𝐾𝐾 parameter matrix containing adjustment to the long-run economic 
relationships among the element of 𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡 , and is the main focus of our analysis. 
 
If variables 𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡  are non-stationary, or  𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡~𝐼𝐼(1), but stationary at a first difference, 
or ∆𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡~𝐼𝐼(0), then, by the Granger representation theorem (Engle & Granger, 1987), 
Π has rank 0 ≤ 𝑟𝑟 < 𝐾𝐾, where 𝑟𝑟 is the number of linearly independent cointegrating 
vectors.  The main assumption underpinning VECM is the conjecture that the system 
of variables should converge to their long term equilibrium, while long-term 
equilibrium is implied by cointegration.   
 
There are three cases involving estimation of Π.  First, if Π has a rank of zero, 
there is no long term equilibrium among variables in 𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡  and the estimation in the form 
of (2), but without the long-run parameters, is sufficient.  And, if Π has rank of 𝐾𝐾, or 
full rank, then all elements of 𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡  are stationary and the estimation in the form of (1) is 
sufficient.  Finally, if Π has reduced rank 𝑟𝑟 where 0 < 𝑟𝑟 < 𝐾𝐾, then Π can be 
decomposed into a loading matrix 𝛼𝛼, and cointegrating equation 𝛽𝛽 where Π = 𝛼𝛼𝛽𝛽. In 
this case, both 𝛼𝛼,𝛽𝛽′ are a 𝐾𝐾 × 𝑟𝑟 matrix of rank 𝑟𝑟.   
 
In the case of two markets or a bivariate model 𝐾𝐾 = 2, if rank 𝑟𝑟 = 1,  then there 
is a long-run price relationship between the two markets represented by cointegration.  
However, if rank 𝑟𝑟 = 0, then there is no long-run relationship between the two prices. 
The procedure to determine rank 𝑟𝑟 is given in the next section. 
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Rearranging terms in (2) gives 
 ∆𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼𝛽𝛽𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡−1 + ∑ Γ𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝−1𝑖𝑖=1 Δ𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡−𝑖𝑖 + 𝜐𝜐 + 𝜖𝜖𝑡𝑡   (3) 
 
where 𝜐𝜐 is a 𝐾𝐾 × 1 vector of parameters for a linear time trend at 𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡 . 
 
The deterministic trends 𝜐𝜐 above can be decomposed into the long-run cointegrating 
equation and a constant. 
 𝜐𝜐 = 𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼 + 𝛾𝛾, (4) 
where 𝛾𝛾 ′𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼 = 0 (5) 
and 𝛼𝛼 is 𝑟𝑟 × 1 vectors of parameters.    
 
Rearranging terms in (3) with (4) yields 
 
 ∆𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼(𝛽𝛽𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛼𝛼) + ∑ Γ𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝−1𝑖𝑖=1 Δ𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡−𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾 + 𝜖𝜖𝑡𝑡 . (6) 
 
4.3 TESTS FOR COINTEGRATION AND ERROR CORRECTION 
The Johansen’s procedure to determine whether there is a long run relationship 
among variables in 𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡  is followed.  Under the maximum likelihood estimation, if the 
log likelihood of the unconstrained model that includes the cointegrating equations is 
significantly different from the log likelihood of the constrained model, which 
excludes cointegrating equations, the null hypothesis of no cointegration is rejected.  
The procedure always starts with the case of no cointegrating equations, or rank of 
zero, and accepts the first null hypothesis, which is non-rejection. 
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By design, this study focuses on bivariate systems; thus, there are always two 
cases for the null hypotheses for each system.  The first null hypothesis is H(0) where 
there is no cointegrating equation.  Second null hypothesis is H(1) where there is only 
one cointegrating equation.  The lags’ order (𝑝𝑝) in each of the bivariate systems are 
chosen based on the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC). In small samples, the AIC 
may have better properties (choose the correct order more often) than the Hannan-
Quinn Information Criterion (HQIC) and Schwartz-Baysian Criterion (SBIC), as they 
are designed for minimizing forecast error variance (see Lutkepohl, 2005). 
 
4.4 COINTEGRATING EQUATIONS 
The cointegrating vector  𝛽𝛽 reveals the long-run relationship between the price 
pairs.  Together with 𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡  and the constant term, the long-run price relationship is 
represented by 𝛽𝛽𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡 + 𝛼𝛼 = 𝛽𝛽1𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑃𝑃1 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑃𝑃2 + 𝛼𝛼.  The cointegrating vector of each of 
markets’ pair is displayed in the form of (1,−𝛽𝛽2) where the coefficient of the first 
market is normalized to one, 𝛽𝛽2 is the coefficient of the second corresponding market, 
and 𝛼𝛼 is a constant term that predicts variable costs related to the trade that would 
make the price in two markets arbitrage-free in the long-run.  Since the model is based 
on the logarithm of prices, 𝛽𝛽2 tell us the long-run percentage change in the rice price 
in the first market when the price in the second market changes by one percent. This 
is usually referred to as “price transmission elasticity” in agricultural market 
literature. To demonstrate a high level of market efficiency, 𝛽𝛽2 should yield a number 
close to one, indicating that price shock from one market is able to transmit to the 
other market quickly,  making the co-movement of prices of the same commodities 
close, albeit at different locations.  Hence, the deviation from one of the 𝛽𝛽2will allow 
us to better understand better the nature of rice market segmentation.  
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On the other hand, the cointegrating vector of the United States’ spot-futures 
pair should also yield (1,−1)′ to demonstrate long-run convergence of spot and 
futures markets.  While the conjecture on the cointegrating equation between milled 
and rough rice is less clear, the estimated parameter should reflect the level of 
marketing markups.  Underlying these views is the strong assumption that transaction 
and transportation costs are stationary, as well as proportional to the price and would 
be captured within 𝛼𝛼. 
 
4.5 PRICE DISCOVERY 
The concept of price discovery generally refers to the process of discovering an 
asset’s full information or its permanent value (see Figuerola-Ferretti and Gonzalo, 
2008).   To observe the degree of price discovery process in each price series, since 
the fundamental value of the stock or commodity is unobservable, the observable 
price must be broken down into two pieces, the core fundamental value and its 
transitory component.  To this end, the use of Gonzalo and Granger’s (1995) 
permanent transitory decomposition technique has gained traction in mainstream price 
discovery literature. Among the first were Harris, McInish, and Wood (1997 and 
2002).   Among many desirable properties, this decomposition technique allows us to 
project both the permanent component (𝑊𝑊𝑡𝑡)and the transitory component (𝑍𝑍𝑡𝑡) on a 
linear combination of the original variables, 𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡 , which is observable. Other attractive 
features of this method, as opposed to the competing price discovery technique (see 
Hasbrouck, 2003) for example, are that the result of decomposition is unique and 
valid even when 𝛽𝛽2 in the cointegrating vector (1,−𝛽𝛽2) is not 1. 
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Based on the Granger and Gonzalo definition of decomposition, the permanent 
component is fully identified as 
 𝑊𝑊𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼⊥𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡  (9) 
where 𝛼𝛼⊥is an orthogonal vector of the 𝛼𝛼 vector, or  𝛼𝛼⊥ ′ ∝= 0, 
and the transitory component is  
 𝑍𝑍𝑡𝑡 = 𝛽𝛽𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡 , (10) 
where 𝛽𝛽 is the cointegrating vector. 
 
Then, the Gonzalo and Granger decomposition of 𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡  becomes 
 𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡 = 𝐴𝐴1𝑊𝑊𝑡𝑡 + 𝐴𝐴2𝑍𝑍𝑡𝑡  (11)
 𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡 = 𝐴𝐴1𝛼𝛼⊥𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 + 𝐴𝐴2𝛽𝛽𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡  (12) 
where 𝐴𝐴1 = 𝛽𝛽⊥(𝛼𝛼⊥ ′𝛽𝛽⊥)−1, 
 𝐴𝐴2 = 𝛼𝛼(𝛽𝛽′𝛼𝛼)−1, 
with 𝛼𝛼⊥ ′ ∝= 0, 
 𝛽𝛽⊥ ′𝛽𝛽 = 0. 
 
To estimate the proportion of permanent value for each market, or price 
discovery, the focus is on the 𝛼𝛼⊥ vector.  Baillie, Booth, Tse, and Zabotina (2002) 
show that, when used in the context of a bivariate system, the permanent share of each 
market in the long term price equilibrium can be obtained from the formula 
 𝛼𝛼⊥ = �𝛼𝛼⊥1𝛼𝛼⊥2� = �� 𝛼𝛼2𝛼𝛼2−𝛼𝛼1�� −𝛼𝛼1
𝛼𝛼2−𝛼𝛼1�
�, (13) 
where 𝛼𝛼⊥1 represents the proportion of long-run price discovery associated 
with the first market and vice versa.  Based on this formula, statistical testing on price 
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discovery can be done via the test of significance on the 𝛼𝛼 vector itself.  For more 
discussion of comparing price discovery measures, please see Yan & Zivot (2007). 
 
5 DATA 
The data includes logarithms of monthly rice prices, where obtained from the 
United States Department of Agriculture (USDA Economic Research Service, 2010) 
and a privately obtained CEIC data subscription.4  The USDA Rice Yearbook collects 
monthly rice prices on various markets both within the US and in other major rice 
exporting countries.  The price series for CBOT rough rice futures is obtained from 
the CEIC data subscription.  A reference price for the U.S. market is the Indica long-
grain number two, based on the Arkansas market as production volume of long-grain 
rice in Arkansas is the largest in the United States.   The U.S. long-grain number two 
is also the underlying commodity for rough rice futures for the Chicago Board of 
Trade. The technical specification of the U.S. long-grain number two is conveniently 
comparable to the Thai 100% grade B which is the global benchmark for rice prices.  
The rice price for the Vietnamese market is referred to as 5% broken double washed.  
Although Vietnamese 5% broken double washed is seen as slightly lower quality and 
not directly comparable to Thai rice, this is the highest quality of Vietnamese rice for 
which data is available.  Both Thai 100% Grade B and U.S. long-grain number two 
are considered high standard, and are equivalent (see Bashir, 2002, Kaosa-ard and 
Juliano, 1990). All three are Indica long-grain rice. 
 
Finally, the adjusted world price calculated by USDA, based on its internal 
formula, is also obtained through the USDA Rice Yearbook.  Change in the USDA 
                                                 
4 See www.ceic.com for information on the subscription 
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adjusted world price affects US rice farmers’ benefits and hence their decisions on 
farms’ operation. 
 
For the remainder of this paper, Thai 100% Grade B will be referred to as ‘Thai 
rice’, Vietnamese 5% broken will be referred to as ‘Vietnamese rice,’ and Arkansas 
long-grain US number two broken not exceeding 4% will be referred to as ‘Arkansas 
rice.’  
 
The data covers price series from January 1998 to February 2010.  The Thai, 
Vietnamese, and Arkansas prices are freight-on-board or F.O.B. pricing.  
The US rough rice price series on the cash market is the average price received by US 
rice farmers.  All prices are quoted in current US dollars. 
 
 
 
Table 5 Summary statistics for the logarithm of rough and milled rice 
prices 1998:1 - 2010:2 
 (Logarithm of) Obs. Mean Std. Dev Min. Max. 
Thai price 146 5.67 0.406 5.13 6.85 
Vietnamese price 146 5.56 0.371 5.01 6.98 
Arkansas price 146 5.89 0.369 5.24 6.84 
Adjusted world price 146 5.37 0.475 4.64 6.46 
CBOT Rough Rice Futures 146 5.15 0.424 4.38 6.18 
USDA Rough Rice price 146 5.16 0.416 4.43 6.08 
Source: Author’s calculation  
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5.1 UNIT ROOT TESTS 
This section gives a standard stationarity analysis preceding the formulation of a 
vector error correction model.  To begin, four of the price series are tested for unit 
root.  A Modified Augmented Dicky-Fuller (MADF) test has been implemented.  To 
control for the effect of the government-imposed export restriction in Vietnamese rice 
market, the original price series were regressed on the dummy variable that indicates 
the export restriction during March 2008 – June 2008.  The predicted residuals of the 
series were then used in the MADF.  The lag order of each price series is selected by 
Schwartz Criterion.  Table 6 shows that the null hypotheses of unit roots could not be 
rejected on all price series at level but were rejected on the first difference on all 
series.  Thus, based on the MADF test, the logarithm of prices is non-stationary at 
level or I(1) and stationary at the first difference or I(0).   
 
5.2 JOHANSEN’S RANK TEST 
The first step in estimating a bivariate system in equation (6) is to run a 
Johansen’s cointegration rank test to determine whether there is any long-run 
relationship among variables of interest. To control for seasonality, a set of centered 
seasonal dummies is added.  This set of dummies is summed to zero over a year so 
that linear terms from the dummies disappear and are replaced with a constant term. 
 
Table 7 presents results with evidence for strong support for a long-run 
relationship between Thai and Vietnamese rice prices.  Johansen’s Rank Test rejects 
the null hypothesis of no cointegration and fails to reject the hypothesis of one 
cointegrating equation.   
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 Table 6  Unit Root Tests 
Time period (1998:1-
2010:2)    
Modified Augmented Dicky-Fuller Test Statistic 
 Level  First Difference 
Thai  -1.08  -2.87** 
Vietnam  -0.71  -2.11** 
Arkansas  -1.44  -4.48** 
World Milled Price  -0.65  -2.31* 
     
CBOT Rough Rice 
Future  -0.97  -6.26** 
USDA Rough Rice  -0.66  -4.81** 
     
H0: Unit Root.   *, and ** denote 5% and 1% significance Level.  The MADF test 
applies the implementation of the ADF test on the price series that is transformed by 
a generalized least squares regression. To control for the effect of the government-
imposed export restriction in Vietnamese rice market, the original prices were 
regressed on the dummy variable that indicates the export restriction during March 
2008 – June 2008.  The predicted residuals were then used in the MADF.   Lag orders 
for each series are selected by Schwartz Criterion. 
 
Table 7  Johansen Cointegration Tests 
Time period (1998:1-2010:2)   
Linear Trend 
 H(0)  H(1) 
Thai - Vietnam  42.32**  0.25 
Thai - Arkansas  15.99*  0.66 
Vietnam - Arkansas  34.64**  1.14 
     
Thai - WMP  10.00  0.33 
Vietnam - WMP  33.54**  0.64 
Arkansas - WMP  12.51  1.00 
     
CBOT Rice Future - USDA Rough Rice  36.81**  0.61 
Arkansas Milled - USDA Rough Rice  33.95**  0.80 
     
H(0): No cointegration, H(1): 1 cointegrating equation. The test specification assumes 
a constant term in VECM.  Lag orders in each system are selected by the Akaike Info 
Criterion (Lutkepohl, 2005).  *, and ** denote 5% and 1% significance level. 
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Johansen’s Rank test also rejects the null hypothesis of no cointegration and fails 
to reject the hypothesis of one cointegrating equation between Thai and Arkansas rice 
prices as well as between Vietnamese and Arkansas rice prices.  Strong evidence of 
price linkages among all major exporters seems to suggest that long-run price shocks 
could transmit from one region to another.  More detailed analysis of the magnitude 
of these linkages will be presented and discussed in the next section. 
 
As to questions relating to the validity of the USDA world market reference price 
among major exporters, the first weakness to the argument is seen when the 
cointegrating rank test finds only one linkage between the USDA World price and the 
Vietnamese market.  The tests do not find any evidence of cointegration between the 
USDA World price and either the Thai or Arkansas market.  While this result cannot 
be used as an indication of an invalid formula for the true world price, it does cast 
doubt over its performance.   
 
Within U.S. domestic rice markets, for the spot and futures of rough rice, 
Johansen’s test finds strong evidence to support a long-run linkage between the cash 
market and rough rice futures.  The test also finds that Arkansas’s milled price and the 
USDA cash rough rice price are cointegrated. 
  
Results from Johansen’s rank tests allow us to formally decompose the long-run 
parameter matrix π into α and β vector. This leaves to the next section detailed 
analysis of the estimated value of the α and β vectors, which will give us a clue to the 
role of price discovery in each market, and its long-term co-movement. 
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6 RESULTS 
The subsection 6.1 comprises three pairs of estimated price relationships, namely 
Thai-Vietnamese markets, Vietnamese-US (Arkansas) markets, and Thai-US 
(Arkansas) markets.  The second subsection analyzes an estimated price relationship 
between the adjusted world price and the Vietnamese rice price.  The third subsection 
discusses a result from estimated price relationship between spot and futures of US 
rough rice.  The final subsection includes an analysis from estimated price 
relationships between the spot price of rough rice and Arkansas milled rice price to 
demonstrate vertical market efficiency.  Recall that all price relationships are 
estimated in the following form. 
 ∆𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼(𝛽𝛽𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛼𝛼) + ∑ Γ𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝−1𝑖𝑖=1 Δ𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡−𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾 + 𝜖𝜖𝑡𝑡  (14) 
6.1 THREE LEADING RICE EXPORTING COUNTRIES 
The results of the VECM estimation on the treated data of Thai-Vietnamese 
and US (Arkansas) -Vietnamese markets from 1998m1 to 2010m2 are shown in (15) 
and (16) respectively.  To control for the effect of the government-imposed export 
restriction in Vietnamese rice market, the original price series were regressed on the 
dummy variable that indicates the export restriction during March 2008 – June 2008.  
The predicted residuals of the series were then used in the VECM estimation.   
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Next, the estimated bivariate error correction model between Thai and 
Arkansas rice price is the following: 
                                                 
5 * and,** denote 5% and 1% significance level. Standard errors are given in parentheses. The 
coefficient of the first variable in the cointegrating vector was normalized to one and thus does not 
have standard errors.  The constant term in the cointegrating equation does not have standard errors 
since it is not directly estimated but is backed out from other estimates. 
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From (15), the cointegrating equation , or β vector, between Thai and Vietnamese 
rice price shows a coefficient of -1.30 on Vietnamese rice price with a 95% 
confidence interval between -1.41 and -1.19. The cointegrating equation above 
extracts the long-run co-movement of Thai and Vietnamese rice prices6.  Since the 
absolute value of the lower range, 1.19, is larger than 1, we can reject the hypothesis 
of market efficiency between Thai and Vietnamese rice, and agree that the long-run 
percentage change in Thai rice price is slightly higher than that for Vietnam.  The 
narrowed range of the estimate also gives us some comfort in terms of precision of 
magnitude.   
                                                 
6 From the cointegrating equation  𝑇𝑇𝐻𝐻 = 1.30𝑉𝑉𝑁𝑁 − 5.66 + 𝜀𝜀,̂ we have  
𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝐻𝐻 = 1.30𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑃𝑃𝑉𝑉𝑁𝑁 − 5.66 + 𝜀𝜀̂  
𝑑𝑑𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝐻𝐻
𝑑𝑑𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑃𝑃𝑉𝑉𝑁𝑁
� = 1.30  
𝑑𝑑𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝐻𝐻
𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝐻𝐻
𝑑𝑑𝑃𝑃𝑉𝑉𝑁𝑁
𝑃𝑃𝑉𝑉𝑁𝑁
� = 1.30  
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Figure 7 depicts the plot of the predicted cointegrating vector: a relatively stable 
graph, fluctuating in closed range, until the first half of 2008 when a large swing in 
the system occurred.  The cointegration vector returns to the same but slightly 
elevated pattern of late 2008.  Since the nature of shock is brief and temporary, one 
plausible explanation is a price-overshooting in the presence of supply-shock.  Early 
2008 was a time when many rice exporting countries decided to restrict their exports 
out of fear that escalating rice prices would create domestic turmoil.  India restricted 
exports of non-basmati rice in February 2008 and Vietnam placed a ban on rice 
exports in March 2008.7  This occurred while Thailand allowed business to go on as 
usual.  Altogether, these decisions effectively pulled available tradable supply from 
the global market, causing a sharp deviation from the long-term co-movement trend.  
Although this non-market intervention was accounted for by an OLS regression on the 
dummy variable of the government intervention but the effect of the short-term price 
overshooting remained visible. 
 
The Gonzalo and Granger (1995) framework allow us to extract more 
information from the alpha vector.  The decomposition method was simplified for the 
case of bivariate systems by Baillie, Booth, Tse, and Zabotina (2002).  Their simple 
formula, 𝛼𝛼⊥1 = 𝛼𝛼2𝛼𝛼2−𝛼𝛼1 ,𝛼𝛼⊥2 = −𝛼𝛼1𝛼𝛼2−𝛼𝛼1 , computes the proportion of long-run 
fundamental value associated with each respective markets.  Based on this formula, 
the proportion of long-run price discovery for the Thai market is 97% versus 3% for 
the Vietnamese market.8  The p-value for the test of statistical significance for the 
price discovery measure is 0.00, and 0.71 for Thai and Vietnamese rice market 
                                                 
7 See Appendix 
8 .4522(.4522 +.0136 ) = 97%, .0136(.4522 +.0136 ) = 3% 
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respectively.  The result suggests that higher proportion of the price discovery 
associated with the Thai market pinpoints its dominance in information source 
compared to the Vietnamese market. 
 
From (16), Arkansas and Vietnamese rice prices show a cointegrating 
relationship with the coefficient of -1 for Vietnam, and a 95% confidence level 
between -1.38 and -0.98. Since the absolute value of the range covers 1, we cannot 
reject the hypothesis that the long-run co-movement between Arkansas and 
Vietnamese rice prices is tightly integrated or equal to one.  The estimated 
cointegration yields an interesting view that these two markets movements are 
roughly the same in the long run.9 
 
The Gonzalo and Granger decomposition method shows that the proportion of 
long-run price discovery for the Arkansas market is 94%, versus 6% for the 
Vietnamese market.10  The p-values associated with Arkansas and Vietnamese 
market’s price discovery are 0.00 and 0.22 respectively.  The higher proportion of the 
price discovery associated with the Arkansas market and its significance reveals its 
dominance in information source compared to the Vietnamese market. 
 
                                                 
9 From the cointegrating equation  𝐴𝐴𝐾𝐾 = 1.19𝑉𝑉𝑁𝑁 − 5.88 + 𝜀𝜀,̂ we have  
𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝐾𝐾 = 1.19𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑃𝑃𝑉𝑉𝑁𝑁 − 5.88 + 𝜀𝜀 ̂  
𝑑𝑑𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝐾𝐾
𝑑𝑑𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑃𝑃𝑉𝑉𝑁𝑁
� = 1.19  
𝑑𝑑𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝐾𝐾
𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝐾𝐾
𝑑𝑑𝑃𝑃𝑉𝑉𝑁𝑁
𝑃𝑃𝑉𝑉𝑁𝑁
� = 1.19 
10 .2639(.2639+.0168 ) = 94%, .0168(.2639+.0168 ) = 6% 
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From (17), the cointegrating equation between Thai and US (Arkansas) rice price 
shows a coefficient of -1.29 with 95% confidence interval between -1.55 and -1.04.  
The absolute value of -1.55 and -1.04 implies that in the long-run percentage change 
in Thai price is more volatile compared to that of Arkansas price.11  As a result, 
market efficiency hypothesis is rejected between the Thai and US (Arkansas) markets.  
The relatively wider range of the interval suggests that while a long-run relationship 
may exist, there could be other driving forces outside this two market system for this 
long-run co-movement. 
 
Figure 9 depicts the plot of the predicted cointegrating equation between Thai 
and Arkansas rice prices.  The large variation in upswing and downswing between 
2002 and 2004 is puzzling.  This significant divergence from zero of the predicted 
cointegrating equation clearly suggests that there could be market-specific factors that 
drive deviation from the long-run co-movement.  Over the longer term, however, the 
predicted cointegrating equation does return to the normal range, which suggests to us 
that shocks during 2002 and 2004 were temporary. 
 
The Gonzalo & Granger decomposition method shows that the proportion of 
long-run price discovery for the Thai market is 51%, versus 49% for Arkansas 
market.12   The p-values for the statistical test of significance for the price discovery 
                                                 
11 From the cointegrating equation  𝑇𝑇𝐻𝐻 = 1.29𝐴𝐴𝐾𝐾 − 1.90 + 𝜀𝜀̂, we have  
𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝐻𝐻 = 1.29𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝐾𝐾 − 1.9 + 𝜀𝜀 ̂  
𝑑𝑑𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝐻𝐻
𝑑𝑑𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝐾𝐾
� = 1.29  
𝑑𝑑𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝐻𝐻
𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝐻𝐻
𝑑𝑑𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝐾𝐾
𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝐾𝐾
� = 1.29 
12 0.0384(0.0368 +0.0384 ) = 51%, 0.0868(0.0368 +0.0384 ) = 49% 
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measure are 0.009 and 0.140 for Thai and Arkansas rice markets respectively. If we 
are to accept 0.15 significance level, this roughly similar proportion of permanent 
value associated with each market implies that both markets equally contribute to 
price discovery.   
 
Table 8 Summary of Price Discovery among Leading Exporters 
Time period  
(1998:1-
2010:2) 
  Rice Market Price Discovery 
 
TH VN 
 
AK VN 
 
TH AK 
Price 
Discovery 
 
0.97 0.03  0.94 0.06 
 
0.51 0.49 
p-value   0.00 0.71   0.00 0.22   0.01 0.14 
Source: Author’s calculation  
 
 
 
Figure 7 Predicted Cointegrated Equation between Thai 
and Vietnam rice markets 
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Figure 8 Predicted Cointegrated Equation between 
Arkansas and Vietnamese rice market  
 
 
Figure 9 Predicted Cointegrated Equation between Thai and 
Arkansas rice market  
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To sum up, with respect to the first hypothesis which states “There exists an 
efficient long-run price relationship among the Thai, Vietnamese, and US rice export 
market”, the evidence above shows that there are long-run linkages among the three 
major rice exporters.  This is a direct result from the fact that we are able to extract 
the long-run co-movement among the three pairs as shown by the price transmission 
elasticities.  However, of the three cases, except for that between Vietnam and 
Arkansas, the market efficiency hypothesis is rejected for the two other cases, as the 
long-run co-movement represented by 𝛽𝛽2 is significantly different from one.  Building 
on these linkages, the finding shows the dominant sources of price discovery are 
Thailand and Arkansas, while the role of Vietnamese rice market appears to be 
informational laggard of the three. 
 
The existence of long-run price linkages among the three rice-exporting countries 
is a sensible discovery as Thailand is the world’s largest rice exporter while the 
United States dominates high-quality rice and high-income markets.  Although the 
estimated price transmission elasticities do not comply with the market efficiency 
hypothesis, the analysis of cointegrating equation, with the aid of graphical plot, 
suggests that the sharp deviation from the cointegrating trend in 2008 could be the 
root cause of hypothesis’s rejections.  Accordingly, this view was reinforced by the 
result based on data prior to 2008 that saw non-rejection of the hypothesis of market 
efficiency on all three cases.13  
 
                                                 
13 Results shown in Appendix 
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6.2 USDA ADJUSTED WORLD PRICE 
In this subsection, the following analysis considers whether the characteristics 
of the USDA adjusted world price can be explained by the movement of one rice-
exporting country.  Recall that only Vietnamese rice price shows a cointegration with 
the USDA adjusted world price.  Accordingly, the estimated bivariate error correction 
model between USDA adjusted world price and Vietnamese price is shown in (18). 
 �
Δ𝑊𝑊𝑀𝑀𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡
Δ𝑉𝑉𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑡
� = � . 0128(. 0333). 2900∗∗(. 0514)� �𝑊𝑊𝑀𝑀𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡−1 −  1.578∗∗(. 0891)𝑉𝑉𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑡−1 − 5.364� 
 + � . 2333∗(. 0931) −. 1643∗∗(. 0511)−. 2852∗(. 1435) . 2062∗∗(. 0788) � �Δ𝑊𝑊𝑀𝑀𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡−1Δ𝑉𝑉𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑡−1 � + �
. 0703(. 0945) . 1331∗∗(. 0519)
−.1071(. 1458) . 0908(. 0801)� �Δ𝑊𝑊𝑀𝑀𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡−2Δ𝑉𝑉𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑡−2 � 
 + � . 0368(. 0930) . 0149(. 0524). 5335∗∗(. 1435) . 0978(. 0808)� �Δ𝑊𝑊𝑀𝑀𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡−3Δ𝑉𝑉𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑡−3 � + �
−.0119(. 0157). 0315(. 0248)� [𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑙𝑙𝑠𝑠𝑙𝑙 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑦𝑦] 
 + � . 0014(. 0050)−.0001(. 0078)� + �𝜖𝜖�𝑊𝑊𝑃𝑃𝜖𝜖�𝑉𝑉𝑁𝑁� (18) 
Although the result above portrays a cointegration between Vietnamese rice and 
USDA adjusted world price, the size of the estimated price transmission elasticity for 
the Vietnamese rice price significantly larger than one, suggesting that, in the long 
run, the USDA adjusted world price accelerates much faster than the Vietnamese rice 
price.   Lacking clear justification of what drives the relationship, it becomes clear 
that the USDA adjusted world price might not represent a good proxy for the actual 
world price.  Combined with the fact that we fail to establish long-run relationships 
with the other two leading rice exporting markets, the overall result does not 
satisfactorily provide an adequate evidence to support the second hypothesis, “the 
USDA adjusted world price reflects a long-run price relationship with Thai, 
  52 
Vietnamese, and US rice”.  This conclusion reinforces Taylor, Bessler, Waller, and 
Rister’s (1996)’s skepticism that other considerations besides market force are in 
place for formulation of the USDA adjusted world price.   
 
6.3 SPOT-FUTURE OF U.S. ROUGH RICE 
In this subsection, the following analysis considers whether there is a 
convergence of spot and futures price of rough rice in the United States domestic 
market.  The estimated bivariate error correction model between spot price of rough 
rice and rough rice futures is shown below. 
 �
Δ𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡
Δ𝐹𝐹𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡
� = �−.1827 ∗∗(. 0312). 0807(. 0567) � �𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡−1 − 1.0194∗∗(. 0361)𝐹𝐹𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡−1 + .0917� 
 + � . 1348∗(. 0678) . 1347(. 1231). 1421∗∗(. 0550) . 3920∗∗(. 0998)�  �Δ𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡−1Δ𝐹𝐹𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡−1� + �
. 0207∗(. 0092)
−.0011(. 0167)� [𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑙𝑙𝑠𝑠𝑙𝑙 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑦𝑦] 
 + � . 0008(. 0029). 0018(. 0053)� + �𝜖𝜖?̂?𝑆𝑃𝑃𝜖𝜖?̂?𝐹𝑇𝑇� (19) 
 From (19), the cointegrating equation, or β vector, between the cash price and 
futures of rough rice shows a coefficient of -1.02 on the futures rice price with a 95% 
confidence interval between -1.09 and -.95.  This is a welcomed result, as the 
cointegrating equation above extracts the long-run co-movement of cash and futures 
rice prices14 and the market efficiency hypothesis is not rejected since the interval also 
                                                 
14 From the cointegrating equation  𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃 = 1.026𝐹𝐹𝑇𝑇 − .0917 + 𝜀𝜀̂, we have  
𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃 = 1.02𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑃𝑃𝐹𝐹𝑇𝑇 − .09 + 𝜀𝜀 ̂  
𝑑𝑑𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝐻𝐻
𝑑𝑑𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑃𝑃𝑉𝑉𝑁𝑁
� = 1.02  
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includes -1.   The price discovery measure also reveals that 31% of permanent value is 
associated with the cash price, while 69% is associated with the future price.15  This 
evidence seems to suggest that the rice future price is a dominant source of 
uncovering new information.  To this end, the result provides supporting evidence to 
the third hypothesis, “there exists a convergence between spot and future markets of 
rough rice in the US market”.  This finding is also consistent with the literature on 
price discovery of commodities (see Figuerola-Ferretti, and Gilbert, 2005) 
 
 
Figure 10 Predicted Cointegrated Equation 
between Spot and Future market of U.S. rough rice 
 
Table 9 Price Discovery of Spot-Future market of U.S. rough rice 
Time period 
(1998:1-2010:2) 
 Spot-Future Price Discovery 
 Spot  Future 
Price Discovery  0.31  0.69 
p-value  0.15  0.00 
 Source: Author’s calculation 
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6.4 VERTICAL MARKET 
We now shift focus to the question of the degree of price discovery between two 
levels of market.  The estimated bivariate error correction model between the F.O.B 
export price of U.S. milled rice and the spot price of rough rice is as follows: 
 �
𝛥𝛥𝐴𝐴𝐾𝐾𝑡𝑡
Δ𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡
� = �−. 1768∗∗(. 0381). 0818(. 0510) � �𝐴𝐴𝐾𝐾𝑡𝑡−1 − . 8483∗∗(.0277)𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡−1 − 1.1205� 
 + �. 6818∗∗(. 0828) . 0422(. 0672). 3530∗∗(. 1109) . 1542(. 0900)� �𝛥𝛥𝐴𝐴𝐾𝐾𝑡𝑡−1Δ𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡−1 � + �
. 0252(. 0987) −. 1605∗(. 0666)
−.0611(. 1322) . 0373(. 0892) � �𝛥𝛥𝐴𝐴𝐾𝐾𝑡𝑡−2Δ𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡−2 � 
 + �. 2957∗∗(. 0913) −.0098(. 0658). 0417(. 1223) . 0803(. 0881)� �𝛥𝛥𝐴𝐴𝐾𝐾𝑡𝑡−3Δ𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡−3 � + �
−.0037(. 0079). 0186(. 0105)� [𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑙𝑙𝑠𝑠𝑙𝑙 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑦𝑦] 
 + � . 0006(. 0025). 0014(.0033)� + �𝜖𝜖?̂?𝐴𝐾𝐾𝜖𝜖?̂?𝑆𝑃𝑃 � (20) 
 
The cointegrating relationship between the Arkansas milled rice and spot 
rough rice shows a coefficient of -.85 on spot rough rice price, with a 95% confidence 
interval between -90 and -.79.  The significance of this finding is that it not only 
reveals a long-run co-movement between two marketing levels, but also provides 
evidence of a variable marked-up price structure, in contrast to a cost-plus structure.  
The price discovery measure reveals that only 32% of permanent value is associated 
with the F.O.B export price of milled-rice while 68% is associated with the spot price 
of rough rice.  Together with results from the last section, it becomes clear that, for 
the U.S. domestic rice market, the first dominant price discovery process take place in 
the futures market, and this is followed by the cash market of the rough rice, and then, 
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finally, is filtered through to the export market. The result provides supporting 
evidence to the fourth hypothesis that “there exists a long-run price relationship 
between U.S. rough and milled rice.” 
 
 
 
Figure 11 Predicted Cointegrated Equation between rough 
and milled rice 
 
 
Table 10 Price Discovery of the Vertical U.S. Rice Markets 
Time period 
(1998:1-2010:2) 
  
Vertical Market Price 
Discovery 
  Milled   Rough 
Price Discovery  0.32  0.68 
p-value   0.14   0.00 
 Source: Author’s calculation 
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7 POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
The findings in the previous section establish that there exist long-term price co-
movements among the three major rice-exporting countries examined in this study.  
Estimated price transmission elasticity also provides us with a preliminary tool to 
gauge the impact from price transmission when the price in one market changes.  
These estimates should be used with the possibility that deviation from long-run 
equilibrium can be sustained for a long time.  The dominant role of price discovery of 
Thai and United States rice markets when compared to that of Vietnam underscores 
the importance of Thailand as the world’s largest rice exporter and the United States’ 
dominance in high-quality rice and high-income markets.   Within the United States 
domestic markets, the success of the Chicago Board of Trade rough rice futures as a 
dominant source of price discovery also highlights the importance of the futures 
market as a hedging tool to farmers. 
 
Recognizing that rice as a staple food is especially crucial for low income 
populations.  Given the trajectory of population growth and climate change, together 
with scarcer land and waters, it is clear that rice supply will continue to be under 
pressure for the foreseeable future.  The current thin market condition for rice does 
not allow room for a significant supply shock.  To prevent malnutrition and improve 
food security means the more efficient role of rice market is required.   
 
Since market inefficiency that arose from supply shock could be averted if the 
market infrastructure allows more rice to be traded.  The first step would be to invest 
in viable storage technology in the rice growing emerging countries, allowing these 
countries to accumulate stocks that can be used as a buffer in the event of supply 
shock.  This in effect would incur less degree of rice price volatility as well. 
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Secondly, governments must continue to support and nurture a viable centralized 
trading platform.  In 2004, Thailand launched a trading of rice futures in the 
Agricultural Futures Exchange of Thailand (AFET) but the volume trade currently is 
dismal.  Governments can engage more systematically through the exchange to 
accumulate or lower national rice stocks in order to boost and draw international 
traders to the market. 
 
8 CONCLUSION 
To summarize the main findings previously discussed.  First through three 
bivariate cointegrated systems, this study found that from 1998m1 to 2010m2, long-
run price co-movements exist among the three major rice-exporting countries, namely 
Thailand, Vietnam, and US (Arkansas).  In addition to this anticipated finding, the 
hypothesis of market efficiency, as captured by the price transmission elasticity, 
𝛽𝛽2 = 1, are rejected in two of the three pairs, namely Thai-Vietnam and Thai-
US(Arkansas) respectively.  Based on the findings, the magnitudes of the estimated 
price transmission elasticities reveal higher acceleration of the Thai and United States 
rice price in the long-run co-movement than that of the Vietnamese rice.  
 
Nonetheless, contrary to this result, the separate estimations with the data prior to 
2008 show supporting evidence to the market efficiency hypothesis on all three price-
pairs.  This striking revelation highlights an effective mechanism of international rice 
market from 1998m1 up to 2008m1 and underscores the importance of further 
investigation on the 2008’s period as a root cause of the market inefficiency.   
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Building on the 1998m1-2010m2 linkages, the Gonzalo & Granger common 
factor decomposition technique shows the dominant sources of price discovery are 
Thailand and Arkansas, while the role of Vietnamese rice market appears to be the 
informational laggard of the three. This finding is sensible as Thailand is the world’s 
largest rice exporter while the United States dominates high-quality rice and high-
income markets.   
 
To evaluate the performance of the USDA adjusted world price relative to other 
major rice exporting countries, this study looks for evidence of long-run relationship 
of the adjusted world price with Thailand, Vietnam, and United States (Arkansas).  In 
this regard, the USDA adjusted world price shows only a long-run linkage with 
Vietnamese market.  The size of the estimated coefficient far from one also pinpoints 
that there could be other factors influencing the USDA world price.  In combination 
with the fact that we fail to establish long-run price relationships between the USDA 
world rice price with the other two leading rice exporting markets, underscores a 
weakened argument to support validity and transparency of the USDA’s 
methodology.  This conclusion reinforces Taylor, Bessler, Waller, and Rister’s 
(1996)’s skepticism that other considerations besides market force are in place for 
formulation of the USDA adjusted world price. 
 
For the US domestic rice markets, the result shows efficient linkage between spot 
and future prices of rough rice, demonstrated by Chicago Board of Trade rough rice 
futures converging to USDA rough rice prices in a cash market. In the vertical 
markets, the result also reveals the significant price linkage between two marketing 
level of rough and milled rice in the United States.  Building on these linkages, the 
Gonzalo & Granger’s decomposition characterizes the dominant source of the price 
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discovery process in the futures market followed by the cash market of the rough rice 
and then the milled rice export price.   
 
Going forward, as the issue of food security becomes increasingly essential due 
to scarcer area of arable land due to competing demand for food as well as for energy, 
the understanding of the relationship among the major rice exporting countries 
remains key necessities especially to rice-importing countries to safeguard the failure 
of international rice supply as a transfer from rice-surplus countries to the rice-deficit 
countries has a meaningful welfare implication.   
 
The advantage of our model’s simplistic design also reveals its inherent 
shortcoming.  The drawback of the model’s reliance on price information is the 
limited interpretation of the estimated elasticities that precludes other significant 
factors underlying market force.    A plausible explanation for the differences in size 
of percentage change that defines the co-movement includes fluctuating exchange 
rates, with exporters incurring costs in local currency but quoting prices in United 
States dollars, and transportation and transaction costs.  Additional study can 
incorporate the role of traditional versus non-traditional investor in commodities 
market as well as investigate market efficiency in the context of bilateral, multilateral 
trade agreements. 
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APPENDIX 
A. THREE LEADING RICE EXPORTING COUNTRIES VECM IN A SUB-
PERIOD 1998m1-2008m1 
In this section the result of the VECM estimation from 1998m1 to 2008m1, or the 
period prior to the 2008’s price spike is provided for Thailand, Vietnam, and US 
(Arkansas).  The hypothesis of market efficiency based on 𝛽𝛽2 = 1 cannot be rejected 
on all three cases. 
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−.0101(. 0105). 0354∗∗(. 0101)� [𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑙𝑙𝑠𝑠𝑙𝑙 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠]  
 + � . 0021(.0032). 0012(.0031)� + �𝜖𝜖̂𝑇𝑇𝐻𝐻𝜖𝜖?̂?𝑉𝑁𝑁� (A1)16 
 �
Δ𝑇𝑇𝐻𝐻𝑡𝑡
Δ𝐴𝐴𝐾𝐾𝑡𝑡
� = �−. 0469∗(. 0231). 0484∗∗(. 0172) � �𝑇𝑇𝐻𝐻𝑡𝑡−1 − 1.010∗∗(.1587)𝐴𝐴𝐾𝐾𝑡𝑡−1 + .2947� 
 + �. 2955∗∗(.0949) . 0831(. 1235). 0134(. 0705) . 5443∗∗(. 0918)� �Δ𝑇𝑇𝐻𝐻𝑡𝑡−1Δ𝐴𝐴𝐾𝐾𝑡𝑡−1� + �
−.1159(. 0954) −.0297(. 1418)
−.0550(. 0709) . 0381(. 1055)� �Δ𝑇𝑇𝐻𝐻𝑡𝑡−2Δ𝐴𝐴𝐾𝐾𝑡𝑡−2� 
 + �−.0569(. 0928) −.0927(. 1279). 0271(. 0690) . 2042∗(. 0951)� �Δ𝑇𝑇𝐻𝐻𝑡𝑡−3Δ𝐴𝐴𝐾𝐾𝑡𝑡−3� + �
−.0126(. 0107). 0027(. 0079)� [𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑙𝑙𝑠𝑠𝑙𝑙 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠] 
 + � . 0016(.0032). 0015(.0024)� + �𝜖𝜖̂𝑇𝑇𝐻𝐻𝜖𝜖?̂?𝐴𝐾𝐾 � (A2) 
                                                 
16 * and,** denote 5% and 1% significance level. Standard errors are given in parentheses. The 
coefficient of the first variable in the cointegrating vector was normalized to one and thus does not 
have standard errors.  The constant term in the cointegrating equation does not have standard errors 
since it is not directly estimated but is backed out from other estimates. 
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 �
ΔAKt
Δ𝑉𝑉𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑡
� = �−. 0428∗(. 0170). 0695∗∗(. 0240) � �𝐴𝐴𝐾𝐾𝑡𝑡−1 − 1.041∗∗(. 1651)𝑉𝑉𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑡−1 − .0977� 
 + �. 5347∗∗(.0923) . 1052(. 0625). 1215(. 1298) . 3756∗∗(. 0880)� �Δ𝐴𝐴𝐾𝐾𝑡𝑡−1Δ𝑉𝑉𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑡−1� + �
. 0487(. 1058) −.0473(. 0654). 1527(. 1488) −.1594(.0920)� �Δ𝐴𝐴𝐾𝐾𝑡𝑡−2Δ𝑉𝑉𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑡−2� 
 + � . 1981∗(. 0935) −.0678(. 0935)
−. 4180∗(. 1315) . 0940(. 0897)� �Δ𝐴𝐴𝐾𝐾𝑡𝑡−3Δ𝑉𝑉𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑡−3� + �
. 0029(. 0074). 0171(. 0104)� [𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑙𝑙𝑠𝑠𝑙𝑙 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠] 
 + � . 0016(. 0024). 0009(. 0034)� + �𝜖𝜖?̂?𝐴𝐾𝐾𝜖𝜖?̂?𝑉𝑁𝑁� (A3) 
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B. SUMMARY OF THE COINTEGRATED EQUATIONS AND TEST OF 
MARKET EFFICIENCY HYPOTHESIS AMONG THREE LEADING 
RICE EXPORTING COUNTRIES 
Cointegrated 
Price 
Relationships 
1998m1-2008m1 
1998m1-2010m2 
Original Treated Data17 
TH-VN 𝑇𝑇𝐻𝐻𝑡𝑡−1 − 1.054∗∗(.0470)𝑉𝑉𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑡−1 + .2110 𝑇𝑇𝐻𝐻𝑡𝑡−1 − 1.1676∗∗(.0381) 𝑉𝑉𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑡−1 + .8145 𝑇𝑇𝐻𝐻𝑡𝑡−1 − 1.300∗∗(.0548)𝑉𝑉𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑡−1— 5.662 
AK-VN 𝐴𝐴𝐾𝐾𝑡𝑡−1 − 1.041∗∗(. 1651)𝑉𝑉𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑡−1 − .0977 𝐴𝐴𝐾𝐾𝑡𝑡−1 − . 9703∗∗(. 0982)𝑉𝑉𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑡−1 − .4852 𝐴𝐴𝐾𝐾𝑡𝑡−1 − 1.1880∗∗(. 1012)𝑉𝑉𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑡−1 − 5.881 
TH-AK 𝑇𝑇𝐻𝐻𝑡𝑡−1 − 1.010∗∗(.1587)𝐴𝐴𝐾𝐾𝑡𝑡−1 + .2947 𝑇𝑇𝐻𝐻𝑡𝑡−1 − 1.2930∗∗(. 1298)𝐴𝐴𝐾𝐾𝑡𝑡−1 + 1.9043 N/A 
 
Source: compiled from the findings 
 
 
 
Hypothesis 
of Market 
Efficiency 
1998m1-2008m1 
1998m1-2010m2 
Original Treated Data 
TH-VN Not rejected Rejected Rejected 
AK-VN Not rejected Not rejected Not rejected 
TH-AK Not rejected Rejected  N/A 
 
Source: compiled from the findings 
  
                                                 
17 The price series were treated to account for non-market intervention in Vietnamese market by i) an 
OLS regression on dummy variable that indicates that rice exports ban is enforced, ii) then the 
computed residuals are used to enter the VECM estimation. 
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C. JARQUE-BERA TEST FOR NORMALITY DISTRIBUTED RESIDUAL 
TERMS 
In this section, we perform misspecification tests to ensure that the underlying 
statistical assumptions are valid.  First, Jarque-Bera test for normally distributed 
residuals are performed and the results are given below.   
 
For each single-equation, the null hypothesis is that the error term has a 
univariate normal distribution.  For the system with two equations jointly, the null 
hypothesis is that the disturbances come from bivariate normal distribution. 
 
 
Equation χ2 df  Prob > χ2 
D_lnTH 29.247 2 0.00000 
D_lnVN 4287.261 2 0.00000 
ALL 4316.508 4 0.00000 
    D_lnTH 360.662 2 0.00000 
D_lnAK 1.295 2 0.52324 
ALL 361.958 4 0.00000 
    D_lnAK 7.819 2 0.02005 
D_lnVN 6417.770 2 0.00613 
ALL 6425.589 4 0.00000 
    D_lnWP 91.305 2 0.00000 
D_lnVN 6799.894 2 0.00000 
ALL 6891.199 4 0.00000 
    D_lnSP 9.621 2 0.00814 
D_lnFT 12.3 2 0.00213 
ALL 21.921 4 0.00021 
    D_lnAK 203.483 2 0.00000 
D_lnSP 41.937 2 0.00000 
ALL 245.42 4 0.00000 
        
Source: Compiled from Stata’s output  
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D. LAGRANGE-MULTIPLIER TEST 
Lagrange-multiplier tests are also performed for the possible autocorrelation of 
the residuals. The formula for the Lagrange-multiplier test statistic at lag j is  
𝐿𝐿𝑀𝑀𝑠𝑠 = (𝑇𝑇 − 𝑑𝑑 − .5)ln� �Σ��
�Σ�s�� 
where T is the number of observations in the estimation; Σ� is the maximum 
likelihood estimate of the variance-covariance matrix of the error terms from the 
estimation; and the Σ�s  is the maximum likelihood estimate of Σ from the following 
augmented regression. First, for the case of 2 equations in the estimation, the error 
terms is defined to be a 2 × 1 vector of residuals. And for each lag 𝑠𝑠, an augmented 
regression in which the newly created error vector are lagged  𝑠𝑠 times is formed. 𝑑𝑑 is 
the number of coefficients estimated in the regression.  The asymptotic distribution of 
𝐿𝐿𝑀𝑀𝑠𝑠 in the case of 2-equation-system is 𝜒𝜒2 with 22 degree of freedom. 
 
 
  Lag 𝑠𝑠 χ2 df  Prob > χ2 
TH-VN 1 4.0299 4 0.40198 
 
2 3.4184 4 0.49039 
 
3 2.8971 4 0.57518 
 
4 2.8238 4 0.58773 
     TH-AK 1 2.4615 4 0.65155 
 
2 4.3421 4 0.36168 
 
3 4.0289 4 0.40211 
 
4 2.4307 4 0.65709 
     AK-VN 1 2.0583 4 0.72504 
 
2 2.8825 4 0.57767 
 
3 2.4107 4 0.66069 
 
4 3.0352 4 0.55194 
     
Source: Compiled from Stata’s output 
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  Lag 𝑠𝑠 χ2 df  Prob > χ2 
WMP-VN 1 7.0997 4 0.13071 
 
2 7.4833 4 0.11245 
 
3 4.3526 4 0.36038 
 
4 0.9407 4 0.91864 
     SP-FP 1 1.6864 4 0.79318 
 
2 3.1866 4 0.5271 
 
3 6.0689 4 0.19406 
 
4 5.6022 4 0.23089 
     AK-SP 1 1.3858 4 0.84665 
 
2 5.0438 4 0.28283 
 
3 2.0384 4 0.7287 
 
4 3.2234 4 0.52116 
          
Source: Compiled from Stata’s output 
 
The Lagrange-multiplier test does not detect problems of autocorrelation in 
any systems. Since the likelihood function is derived under the assumption that the 
residuals are independently, identically, and normally distributed with zero mean and 
finite variance. If the normality assumption is rejected but the residual is independent 
and identically distributed, the estimates are consistent but not efficient.  This implies 
that the estimates would converge to the true value in large sample but may not have 
minimum variance. 
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E. CHRONOLOGY OF THE 2007-08 RICE CRISIS 
This table is an excerpt from Slayton (2009) appendix. 
 
Date Event 
December 21st, 
2007 
NFA tender 500,000 tons and buys 422,701 tons at an average 
price of $410 CNF. Vietnam sells 410,701 tons. 
 
December 31st  Thailand’s shipments exceed 9.5 million tons, while India 
records 6.3 million tons – including 5.25 million tons of non-
Basmati. Vietnam’s exports top 4.5 million tons. 
 
Janruary 14th, 
2008 
Cold spell begins in northern Vietnam which over several 
weeks destroys 148,000 ha of transplanted rice and 10,000 ha 
of seedlings. 
 
Janruary 18th  Vietnam’s export target raised from 4.4 million tons to 4.5 
million tons, including 700,000 tons January-March, 1.5 
million tons each in second and third quarters, and 800,000 
tons October-December. Exports are allowed to resume with 
MEP of $385 for 5% and $360 for 25% for January-February 
shipment and $400 for 5% for March. Informally, VFA asks 
that no sales of 25% be made. 
 
Janruary 29th NFA tenders for 550,000 tons and buys 463,750 tons at an 
average price of $475 CNF. Vietnam sells 300,000 tons. Facing 
large losses on unshipped contracts concluded in late 2007, 
major exporters in Thailand stop offering price quotes. 
 
February 1st NFA’s stocks are equivalent to 8 days requirements, just over 
half of the targeted level of 15 days. (NFA’s stocks are to be at 
least 30 days during the “lean” season.) 
 
February 5th Vietnam informally banned new rice exports by revoking MEP 
and stop issuing any additional MEPs during February 2008. 
 
March 6th Export quotas announced in Vietnam: January-March 700-
800,000 tons, April-June 1.3-1.5 million tons, July-September 
1.3-1.4 million tons, and October-December 700-800,000 tons. 
This effectively bans further sales in March given existing 
sales to NFA and others. 
 
March 14th Vietnam Food Association issues letter to members banning 
exports through April and promises guidance for May shipment 
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at a later time. 
 
March 17th First arrivals in Bangladesh from initial contract by India 
under promised 500,000 tons. Vietnam bans further sales for 
March and April. Only sales for May allowed. 
March 25th Vietnam extends export ban through June and reduces export 
target by .5-1.0 million tons to 3.5-4.0 million tons. 
 
March 26th Vietnam decrees that no export contracts will be approved 
unless exporter is holding as stock 50% of the sale, prices must 
be in line w/ MEP, and shipment within 60 days; Export quotas 
revised: January-June 2.25 million tons (50% of total exports in 
’06 and ’07); 3.5 million tons through September; MOU with 
the Philippines for 1.5 million tons announced. 
 
March 28th Commerce minister in Thailand told press that export prices 
would reach $1,000/ton by June and that farmers should not be 
in a hurry to sell. 
 
March 29th Export tax proposed in Vietnam. 
 
April 1st India bans non-Basmati exports, Basmati MEP rises to $1,200. 
Head of All India Rice Exporters’ Association forecasts a 5.25 
million ton drop in exports over the next twelve months. In an 
effort to quell rising domestic prices, the minister of commerce 
indicates the government in Thailand will release up to 
650,000 tons from its stockpiles into the domestic market at 
below-market prices. In the Philippines, the government 
rejects a proposal to reduce the import tariff on rice from its 
current rate of 50%. 
 
April 4th With hoarding underway by rice mills, traders, and public, 
prime minister in Thailand assures there is enough rice for 
domestic consumption, but indicates a commerce ministry plan 
to distribute subsidized rice is not necessary. Finance and 
commerce ministers repeat assurances that the country will not 
restrict exports. Following a “summit” with government 
officials and farm experts on how to contain the rice crisis, 
President Arroyo in the Philippines announces the government 
will spend over $1.0 billion to increase rice production. The 
agriculture secretary tells press that 2007 imports could reach 
as high as 2.7 million tons. 
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April 8th  In the Philippines, the government indicates it will tender for 
500,000 tons in May. NFA tenders for 100 TMT of U.S. 
#2/4%; purchased 72,600 tons for June-Sep shipment at 
average price of over $1,058. 
 
April 10th Thailand’s commerce minister announces that effective from 
April 14 all retail rice prices will be reduced 10% for two 
months. Also, head of Internal Trade Department indicates that 
millers and exporters must report stock levels monthly and that 
army could be called in to guard rice warehouses. Also, 
exporters will be required to hold stock of 500 tons. Head of 
Thai rice exporters’ association predicts 100% B will soon 
reach $1,000. 
April 11th  In Thailand, the commerce minister asks the military to guard 
the government-held stocks. 
 
April 14th U.N. secretary general says global food crisis has reached 
“emergency proportions." 
 
April 17th NFA tenders for 500,000 tons and buys 364,000 tons at an 
average price of $1,075 CNF for 25% (323,375 tons) and 
$1,129 for 5% (40,625 tons each).. Vietnam sells 80,000 tons 
(not including 20,875 tons sourced out of Pakistan via Long An 
Food). 
 
April 22nd Prime minister of Thailand denies country will restrict exports. 
 
April 23rd Head of NFA indicates it is considering holding weekly import 
tenders. 
 
April 25th In Vietnam “rice fever” breaks out, prices have doubled in 
HCMC over the course of a couple of days. India announces it 
will build 5 million ton “strategic reserve” of food grains, 
including 2 million tons of rice – beyond its stocking norms. 
U.N. Secretary General Ban calls for concerted and immediate 
action to solve global food crisis. Head of FAO tells press 
global food crisis could result in “civil wars.” 
 
April 28th Decree against speculators issued in Vietnam. 
 
April 30th Thailand’s prime minister revives proposed rice exporter cartel, 
OREC. 
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May 5th NFA tender for 675,000 tons fails as only one offer received 
and it without a sovereign guarantee; the Philippines talks of 
waiting until fall to buy. It indicates it will not, in any case, pay 
above $1,200/ton. 
 
May 6th Following objections from the Philippines and the ADB, 
Thailand scraps OREC proposal. 
May 13th Malaysia buys from Thailand 100,000 tons each of 5% at $950 
and 15% at $940. 
 
May 19th Philippines discloses Japan may also provide 200,000 tons 
imported rice. 
 
May 21st Major exporters in Thailand resume offering price quotes. 
 
May 23rd Thailand’s visiting prime minister reportedly tells President 
Arroyo that Bangkok is prepared to sell its stocks to the 
Philippines at friendship prices. 
 
June 2nd At FAO summit on food crisis, Japan’s P.M. Fukuda commits 
"to release in the near future over 300,000 tons of imported 
rice” to the world market. Japan also discloses Sri Lanka has 
requested up to 200,000 tons of food aid. Prime minister takes 
commerce minister’s proposal off cabinet agenda that would 
authorize Thailand to participate in NFA’s request for G-to-G 
offers of 600,000 tons by June 13. 
 
June 10th Prime minister takes commerce minister’s proposal off cabinet 
agenda that would authorize Thailand to participate in NFA’s 
request for G-to-G offers of 600,000 tons by June 13. 
 
June 13th Philippines receives offers for G-to-G purchase of 600,000 
tons. 
 
June 18th Vietnam’s export ban lifted; MEP $800 for 5% established. 
Source: Slayton (2009) 
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CHAPTER THREE 
THE DETERMINANTS TO FORMAL CREDIT AND INFORMAL CREDIT 
PARTICIPATION: THE CASE OF THAI FARM HOUSEHOLDS 
 
1 INTRODUCTION   
This study examines the determinants of agricultural households’ participation in 
formal and informal credit markets in Thailand.  Formal credits are broadly defined as 
credits obtained from institutions that are registered to do lending business.  Informal 
credits are credits obtained from all non-institution lenders, such as local lenders, 
landlords, traders, or more casually, a person outside of a household.   
 
Increasing modernization, and export-oriented development that pull resources 
away from traditional agricultural sector and into manufacturing and services, entail 
an ever expanding income gap between urban rich and rural poor.  And, despite 
growth in formal credit in recent years, rural farmers and entrepreneurs still have 
difficulties accessing funding, particularly those who are poorer and perceived to be at 
higher risk (see Paulason & Townsend, 2004). Insufficient funding, despite the need 
for farm households both to finance farming operations and smooth their consumption 
cycle, underscores the onset of a vicious cycle in which external shocks in income 
shortfalls or unexpected consumption needs can leave even less funding available for 
the productive cause, leading to the growing portion of principal (see Siamwalla, et al., 
1993).  With considerable impact on a large portion of Thai population, alleviating the 
debt situation of Thai farmers remains the central policy of all recent administrations.   
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While the literatures suggest that an informal credit market can emerge from 
credit rationing of the formal credit sector, what remains to be seen is a careful 
analysis of micro foundation of this informal credit market, itself.  The lack of credible 
data on informal credit typically prevents a thorough empirical study on the informal 
market.  And, indeed, there are only few empirical studies that investigate Thai 
farmers’ credit situation (see Siamwalla, et al., 1993, Paulason and Townsend, 2004, 
Gine, 2005, Boonperm, Haughton, and Khandker, 2009, Kaboski and Townsend, 
2009).  Despite this setback, detailed analysis of the role of parallel credit market and 
its significance remains key to designing informed and sound policy.  Accordingly, 
this study’s main objective is to determine, based on household characteristics and 
their observed qualities, factors affecting probability of success in informal credit 
participation. 
 
 Using the 2006 Socio-Economic Household Survey of Thailand, this study 
follows Heckman’s two-stage selection model approach to determine the informal 
loan participation of Thai agricultural households.  Since we can observe the behavior 
of formal and informal credit participants only if they participate in new loans, one 
might view this pool of samples as self-selected.  The dire consequence of self-
selection bias is first illuminated in Heckman (1979).  To demonstrate within this 
context, unobservable variables such as business acumen may affect both the 
probability of success in obtaining credit as well as the probability of success in 
participating in formal loans.  Higher values of business acumen lead to higher success 
in obtaining credit, and thus successful borrowers are likely to have higher values of 
business acumen than non-borrowers.  As a consequence of this, the probability of 
success in obtaining formal credit is overestimated from the influence of any selected 
sample.  Hence, excluding the selection stage to engage in new loans from the full 
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estimation induces a selection bias due to a non-random sample.  See Achen (1986) 
and Sartori (2003) for more discussion of selection bias.  
 
Results from the two-stage selection model provide supporting evidence that, 
facing credit rationing, households are more likely to ‘stick’ to the credit market they 
previously engaged in, whether the formal or informal credit market.  This finding 
reinforces the vicious cycle which makes it more difficult for farmers to get out of 
debt.  Secondly, the study finds supporting evidence that wealthier households are less 
likely to access credit, but, if they do, they are more likely to participate in formal 
credits, and the opposite is true of less wealthy households.   Thirdly, the study finds 
supporting evidence for less credit participation during May and December coinciding 
with the planting and harvesting seasons.   Specifically, the probability for accessing 
new credit starts off high in the beginning of the year then slowly declines while 
participation in informal credit, conditional on participating in new credit, rises toward 
the end of the year.  Alarmingly, this indicates that, while overall access to new credit 
declines, people who need credit tend to participate in informal credit more as months 
pass.  This piece of evidence pinpoints the limited role of BAAC in providing working 
capital only and not consumption-based loans underlining the importance of the lack 
of formal credit facility for farmers, and should be addressed quickly.  Finally, the 
model finds that households with owned farmland are more likely to participate in the 
formal credit market, while households with rented farmland are more likely to 
participate in the informal credit market stressing the use of owned land as collateral 
to participate in formal credit channels.   
 
There are two key contributions to this study.  First, to the best of my knowledge, 
this is the first implementation of Heckman’s approach in a context of formal/informal 
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loan participation using Thai data. Second, processing the survey data into twelve 
monthly pieces allows us to uncover a pattern in seasonal debt participation of Thai 
farmers. 
 
2 SURVEY OF LITERATURE RELATED TO THE INFORMAL CREDIT 
MARKET 
The theoretical understanding of the informal credit market has been advanced by 
the study of imperfect information and imperfect enforcement in credit markets (see 
Hoff, Braverman, and Stiglitz, Introduction, 1993). This section briefly describes a 
theoretical foundation for understanding characteristics of the informal credit market. 
 
In equilibrium with full information, lenders know types of borrowers 
beforehand, and charge high risk types with higher interest rates and low risk types 
with lower interest rates.  There are two rates to clear the market.  In a world with 
asymmetric information, since lenders cannot differentiate between high risk 
borrowers and low risk borrowers, lenders charge one rate for all. If the rate starts to 
rise, low-risk borrowers drop out first, and lenders’ income discontinuously drops 
because high risk borrowers have lower probability of repayment. Results of important 
work by Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) serve to explain why, int equilibrium, some 
borrowers are still rejected by formal credit institutions, despite efforts to pay higher 
interest rates.  Credit rationing arose from financial institutions setting interest rates 
lower than the market-clearing rate allows for the coexistence of the informal credit 
market to serve residue demand for loans.   
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This understanding of the coexistence of formal and informal credit markets has 
been emphasized by the empirical study of Bell, Srinivasan, & Udry (1997), who 
provide evidence of credit rationing in the formal sector and informal credit 
flourishing to serve this unsatisfied demand.  Kochar (1997) provides theoretical and 
empirical evidence to support such coexistence but postulates that the extent of 
rationing is less than what is conventionally assumed.  Guirkinger (2006) found 
empirical evidence that the informal sector in Piura, Peru serves both households 
excluded from the formal sector and households that prefer informal loans because of 
lower transaction costs.  
 
Next, since informal credits usually lack a formal contract and are not legally 
binding, what motivates borrowers to repay their debts is simply a guarantee to get 
future loans.  Aryeetey & Udry (1995) show that, by using a simple setup of repeated 
games, Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium reveals that borrowers have incentives to 
repay their loans in order to secure future borrowings.  The implication of this work is 
that an informal credit market can continue to thrive without becoming a legal 
business entity as long as borrowers have easy access to informal creditors, and there 
are no competing creditors. 
 
In this niche and segmented market, the work by Hoff and Stiglitz (1998)  shows 
that increases in the number of moneylenders creates less incentive for borrowers to 
maintain a good credit reputation, since it is easier to defect to other money lenders.  
The increase in monitoring efforts of moneylenders can result in higher interest rates 
charged. Gine (2005) formulated a theoretical model and used Thai data to show that 
enforcement costs serve as a barrier to entry into informal credit markets.  
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Siamwalla, et al. (1993) also noted that interest rates of the informal sector were 
higher because transaction costs are high.  These transaction costs reflect the 
information costs associated with current borrowers.  Since only previous lenders have 
access to this information, if the same borrowers were to shift to different lenders, the 
marginal information costs to the new lender would be quite high.   
 
3 BRIEF HISTORY OF BAAC AND VRF 
In 1966, the Thai Government established the Bank of Agriculture and 
Agricultural Cooperatives (BAAC) as a state enterprise under the jurisdiction of the 
Ministry of Finance, to provide credit to the agricultural sector. The Thai Government 
mandates that commercial banks have to lend to the agricultural sector as a certain 
proportion of their overall portfolio, or can achieve that goal by making a deposit to 
the BAAC.  In order to maintain a high repayment rate, the BAAC implements the 
following policies. The due date of a debt is usually right after the harvesting season.  
The amount of a loan overdue will be subject to a higher interest rate than the previous 
rate.  New loans will not be provided until the old debt is sorted out -- either by paying 
the interest component alone, or both interest and principle.  The BAAC also 
implements a pooled credits system.  If a member of the pool, comprising eight to 
fifteen people, defaults, the group as a whole becomes ineligible for new loans.  As a 
result, the operation at the BAAC has been very successful and become a central credit 
facility for Thai farmers.  It is often observed that Thai farmers are more inclined 
toward servicing the debt of the BAAC, sometimes even at the cost of tapping into 
higher interest rate loans from local lenders.  The success of the BAAC operation is 
emphasized by a rapid expansion in lending to farmers and farmers’ institutions with 
  80 
the amount of lending growing at a compound average growth rate of 8.5% per year 
over ten years, while the average loan per farmer grew at 6.2% per year.18 
 
 
Table 1 BAAC's Operation 
Number of Farm Households Serviced by BAAC (in millions)   
  2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Farmers 3.9 4.0 4.1 4.3 4.54 
Members of Farmer 
Institutions 1.5 1.5 1.6 1.6 1.5 
Total 5.4 5.5 5.7 5.9 6.1 
%change 0.3% 3.0% 2.5% 4.1% 2.7% 
       
BAAC's Lending Operation (in billions Baht)       
Normal Operation           
 Farmers 299.0 345.2 369.8 397.8 418.5 
  Farmer Institutions 15.0 17.8 21.3 22.1 24.7 
Total 314.0 363.0 391.1 419.9 443.2 
%change 15.2% 15.6% 7.7% 7.4% 5.5% 
       
Average Loan to Farmers (in 
thousands Baht) 58.4 65.5 68.9 71.0 73.0 
%change 14.9% 12.3% 5.1% 3.2% 2.8% 
       
Government Mandate           
 Government Secured Loans Project 37.1 32.2 12.0 5.6 4.25 
 Loans to VRF 9.0 6.4 4.9 2.6 1.0 
 Others 20.7 20.1 20.6 21.2 31.457 
Total 66.8 58.7 37.5 29.3 36.7 
%chng 35.3% -12.1% -36.2% -21.8% 25.2% 
       
BAAC's Deposit 354.3 431.4 496.6 514.7 585.9 
Lending to Deposit Ratio 1.1 1.0 0.9 0.9 0.8 
Source: compiled from BAAC’s Annual reports 
 
                                                 
18 Author’s calculation from data compiled from BAAC annual reports 
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Despite its modest success, the BAAC is only allowed to give out loans based 
on ‘productive’ causes, specifically working capital toward farm operation.  While this 
coverage specifically aims to exclude the portion that relates to household 
consumption, lacking other sources of credit, it is often observed that farmers find 
themselves tapping into these funds for consumption purposes, anyway.  This leaves 
less available funding for productive agricultural purposes.  As a result, farmers often 
find themselves entering the vicious cycle of never being able to pay off debt entirely 
as its principle portion grows larger every year (see Siamwalla, et al., 1993) 
 
In 2001, the Thai Government introduced the Thailand Village Revolving 
Fund (VRF) as a government-funded microfinance project to lift farm households out 
of chronic poverty.  Essentially, the government injected 1 million baht into each 
village via a locally-run village fund committee which then supervised the setting of 
interest rates, loan amounts, terms of loans, and other requirements for borrowing.  To 
set up a committee requires a quorum of at least three quarters of adults in the village.  
The committee then consists of 15 members, half of whom are women (see Boonperm, 
Haughton, and Khandker, 2009). Boonperm, Haughton, & Khandker, (2009) report 
that average VRF borrower is   47% poorer than those who do not borrow based on 
income per capita, and twice as likely to be farmers and self-employed.  The 
astounding success of the VRF in providing credit access to poor farmers as part of a 
set of populist policies helped bring the initiated-party a second term landslide victory 
in February of 2005 (see Thai Rak Thai's Victory: It was Thaksin who made up voters' 
minds, 2005, Mid-year Economic Review, 2004, Profile: Thaksin Shinawatra, 2009). 
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4 EMPIRICAL STRATEGY 
This section describes a household loan participation model.  First, households 
choose to access credit markets, then choose to participate in either informal or formal 
loans.  Probability of success in borrowing and participating in either formal or 
informal credit channels is to be determined exclusively by the household 
characteristics.   
 
This two-step decision—to gain access first, then choose to participate in either 
informal or formal loans—utilizes bivariate probit with a selection model, an 
equivalent of Heckman’s selection model (Heckman, 1979), except that here both 
selection equation and outcome equation are probit.  Since we can observe the 
behavior of formal and informal credit participants only if they participate in new 
loans, one might view this pool of samples as self-selected.  For instance, an 
unobservable variable such as business acumen may affect both the probability of 
success in obtaining credit as well as probability of success in participating in a formal 
loan.  Higher values of business acumen lead to higher success in obtaining credit, and 
thus successful borrowers are likely to have higher values of business acumen than 
non-borrowers.  As a consequence of this, the probability of success in obtaining 
formal credit is overestimated from the influence of the selected sample.  Hence, 
excluding the selection stage, to engage in new loans from the full estimation, induces 
a selection bias due to a non-random sample.  See Achen (1986) and Sartori (2003) for 
more discussion of selection bias.  
 
First consider the following binary model where 𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖∗ is the unobserved cost-benefit 
function of household 's participation  in a credit market. And let 𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖  be the observed 
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binary variable of household i, equal to 1 if household i accesses a new loan and 0 
otherwise.  𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖∗ is determined by a vector of explanatory variables w. 
 𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖∗ = 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖′𝛾𝛾 + 𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖  (1) 
 𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖  = �1 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖∗ > 00𝑖𝑖  𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖∗ ≤ 0   (2) 
Further assume that,  
 𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖~𝑁𝑁(0,1) 
 
And let Φ(. ) be a cumulative density function of standard normal distribution.  
Then we have, 
 Pr(𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖 = 0) = P r(𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖∗ ≤ 0)  
 = Pr�𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖′𝛾𝛾 + 𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖 ≤ 0�  
 = Pr(𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖 ≤ −𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖′𝛾𝛾)  
 = Φ(−𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖′𝛾𝛾) (3) 
 And by symmetry, 
 Pr(𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖 = 1) = P r(𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖∗ > 0)  
 = Pr�𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖′𝛾𝛾 + 𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖 > 0� 
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 = Pr(𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖 > −𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖′𝛾𝛾)  
 = 1 − Φ�−𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖′𝛾𝛾�  
 = Φ�𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖′𝛾𝛾� (4) 
Next, consider at the same time that household i is accessing new credit, its 
characteristics also affect its probability of success to participate in either the informal 
or formal credit market.  Let 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖  be 1 if household i participates in the informal credit 
market, and 0 otherwise.  And let the underlying index function 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖∗ depend on a vector 
of explanatory variables 𝑥𝑥. 
 
 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖∗ = 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖′𝛽𝛽 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖  (5) 
 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 = �1 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖∗ > 0, 𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖∗ > 0 0 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖∗ ≤ 0,  𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖∗ > 0   (6) 
 
Now, let 𝜙𝜙2(. ) be a bivariate density function and assume further that  𝜀𝜀,𝑑𝑑  are 
bivariate standard-normally distributed with mean zero and a correlation between u 
and 𝜀𝜀 equal to 𝜌𝜌. 
Formally,   
 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖~𝑁𝑁(0,1)  
 𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖~𝑁𝑁(0,1)  
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 𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟(𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖 ,𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖) = 𝜌𝜌  
Then, it follows that 
 Pr(𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 = 1, 𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖 = 1) = Pr(𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖∗ > 0 ,  𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖∗ > 0;𝜌𝜌)  
 = Pr�𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖′𝛽𝛽 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖 > 0 ,  𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖′𝛾𝛾 + 𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖 > 0;𝜌𝜌�   
 = Pr(𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖 > −𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖′𝛽𝛽 ,  𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖 > −𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖′𝛾𝛾;𝜌𝜌) (7) 
 
 where Pr(𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 = 1, 𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖 = 1) is the probability of household i success in 
participating in informal credit.  Recall the bivariate probability density function, 
 
 𝜙𝜙2(𝜀𝜀,𝑑𝑑) = 12𝜋𝜋𝜎𝜎𝜀𝜀𝜎𝜎𝑑𝑑�1−𝜌𝜌2 exp �−12 �𝜀𝜀2+𝑑𝑑2−2𝜌𝜌𝜀𝜀𝑑𝑑1−𝜌𝜌2 ��  
 
 Rearranging terms in (7) gives,  
 Pr(𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 = 1, 𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖 = 1) = ∫ ∫ 𝜙𝜙2(𝜀𝜀,𝑑𝑑;𝜌𝜌)𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖′ 𝛽𝛽−∞ 𝑑𝑑𝜀𝜀𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖′ 𝛾𝛾−∞  
 = Φ2(𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖′𝛽𝛽 ,  𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖′𝛾𝛾;𝜌𝜌)  (8) 
 and, 
 Pr(𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 = 0, 𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖 = 1) = Pr(𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖 = 1) − Pr(𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 = 1, 𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖 = 1)  
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 = Φ(𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖′𝛾𝛾) −Φ2(𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖′𝛽𝛽,𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖′𝛾𝛾;𝜌𝜌). (9) 
where Pr(𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 = 0, 𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖 = 1) is the probability of household i’s success in 
participating in formal credit.  Finally, the log-likelihood function for the bivariate 
probit model with selection is, 
 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝐿𝐿 = ∑ 𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖{𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖=1 Φ2(𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖′𝛽𝛽,𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖′𝛾𝛾;𝜌𝜌) 
 +𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖(1 − 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖) ln[ Φ(𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖′𝛾𝛾) −Φ2(𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖′𝛽𝛽,𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖′𝛾𝛾;𝜌𝜌)] 
 +(1 − 𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖) lnΦ(−𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖′𝛾𝛾)} (10) 
 where 𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖  is the weight for observation i. 
Then, using the maximum likelihood procedure, we can obtain ?̂?𝛽, 𝛾𝛾�, and 𝜌𝜌�. 
 max{𝛽𝛽 ,𝛾𝛾 ,𝜌𝜌}  𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝐿𝐿 = max{𝛽𝛽 ,𝛾𝛾 ,𝜌𝜌} ∑ 𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖{𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖=1 Φ2(𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖′𝛽𝛽,𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖′𝛾𝛾,𝜌𝜌) 
 +𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖(1 − 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖) ln[ Φ(𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖′𝛾𝛾) −Φ2(𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖′𝛽𝛽,𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖′𝛾𝛾;𝜌𝜌)] 
 +(1 − 𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖) lnΦ(−𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖′𝛾𝛾)} (11) 
It is important to note that when 𝜌𝜌 = 0, the joint log-likelihood is the sum of the 
two log-likelihoods of two separate probits.  And it would be more efficient to 
estimate each probit independently. 
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4.1 MARGINAL EFFECTS 
To determine the probability of participation in informal credit conditional on 
accessing new credit, predicted marginal probability of the estimates can be calculated 
from the following formula. 
 Pr⁡(𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 = 1|𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖 = 1) = Pr (𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖=1,𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖=1)Pr⁡(𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖=1)  
 = Φ2�𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖′ 𝛽𝛽 ,𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖′ 𝛾𝛾 ;𝜌𝜌�
Φ�𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖
′ 𝛾𝛾�
 (12) 
 Similarly, the probability of participating in formal credit conditional on 
accessing new credit is the following: 
   
 Pr( 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 = 0|𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖 = 1) = Pr (𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖=0,𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖=1)Pr (𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖=1)    
 
 = Φ�𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖′ 𝛾𝛾�−Φ2�𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖′ 𝛽𝛽 ,𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖′ 𝛾𝛾 ;𝜌𝜌�
Φ�𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖
′ 𝛾𝛾�
 (13) 
 For references in this section see Golder (2008) and Greene (2003). 
 
5 DATA 
The data source is the Socio-Economic Survey of Thailand (2006) obtained from 
the Thai National Statistics Office.  The design of the survey employs a stratified two-
stage sampling method with Changwat (76 provinces) stratum.  For each province, 
two additional stratum are added and classified as municipal and non-municipal areas.  
Each municipal and non-municipal area or rural village is independently sampled with 
probability that is equal to the inverse of the number of households within that village.  
Total households within each chosen village are compiled and ranked by size and 
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economic type.  From each municipal area, 15 households are sampled.  And, for a 
non-municipal area or a village, only 10 households are sampled. The number of total 
households is then equally divided into 12 groups.  Each individual group has 
approximately the same number of households in both municipal and non-municipal 
areas.  Each group is then randomly selected for a survey for each of the twelve 
months.  The survey collects a wide variety of socio-economic data, including 
household characteristics, income, expenditure, debt, and an assets profile. 
 
We have a total of 6195 household samples in the estimations.  The weight 
structure associated with the survey-design was applied to the estimation. 
 
5.1 VARIABLES 
Table 2 lists the statistical properties of key variables used in the analysis.  SES 
defines loans from the formal sector as loans that originated from: i) Commercial 
Banks, ii) the BAAC, iii) the Government Housing Bank and Saving Bank, iv) Other 
financial companies, v) Savings co-op organization’s welfare, and vi) the VRF.  Loans 
from informal source are defined as loans that originated from persons outside of 
households.  
 
The dependent variable is a binary variable of household i having a new debt and 
a binary variable of household i having an informal debt.  The key feature of this SES 
dataset is that the sample was collected throughout the year, allowing us to monitor the 
month/ harvest cycle effect using seasonal dummy variables. 
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Total income per capita measures net monthly household income, net of 
remittance, per capita.  Age, age-squared, and gender are the variables associated with  
heads of households. Primary, secondary, and college education are the ratio variables 
associated with proportion of households with at least primary education, secondary 
education, and college education and above.   
 
Family size counts the number of all members within the household.  The 
dependency ratio measures the number of children under 15 and elderly, aged 65 and 
over, divided by the number of the household members between age 15 and 65.  
 
 
 
𝐷𝐷𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝𝑠𝑠𝑙𝑙𝑑𝑑𝑠𝑠𝑙𝑙𝑐𝑐𝑦𝑦 𝑟𝑟𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠 = (# 𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖 𝑝𝑝𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙𝑠𝑠 𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑑𝑑 0 −  14) + (# 𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖 𝑝𝑝𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙𝑠𝑠 𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑑𝑑 65 𝑠𝑠𝑙𝑙𝑑𝑑 𝑠𝑠𝑣𝑣𝑠𝑠𝑟𝑟)# 𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖 𝑝𝑝𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙𝑠𝑠 𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑑𝑑 15 − 65  
 
Land, land 2, and land 3 are three agricultural land variables classified by 
ownership.  The land variable is the area of farmlands owned by the head of 
household, including parents and relatives.  Land2 is the area of farmlands rented from 
other persons.  And Land3 is the area of public lands. 
 
Region 2-5 are regional dummies, Central (2), North (3), North East (4), and South 
(5), capturing the regional variation in agricultural productivity, rainfall, and level of 
infrastructure development.  Region 1 is Bangkok and its neighboring industrial 
provinces, with minimal presence of farmland.   
 
Rice x Region 2 to 5 are interaction dummy variables associated with being rice 
farmers, operating in associated regions.  Since the survey shows half of farm 
households are rice farmers, incorporating these variables allows us to investigate 
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characteristics of rice farmers in different regions more carefully.  Monthly dummies 
represent the surveyed month capturing variation in harvest cycles.  
 
Other shock variables include medical illness, disability, and negative financial 
shocks.  These represent dummy variables of external shocks to households.  A 
medical shock is 1 if the household incurred medical expenses associated with in-
patient hospitalization.  Disability is 1 if the household has at least 1 disabled person.  
A financial shock is 1 if the household reports problems of being behind on house 
rent, water, or electricity bills, or school tuitions and fees. 
 
Informal and formal outstanding debts represent dummy variables associated with 
a household having informal or formal debt outstanding up to the previous month.  
Based on the 2006 SES, Table 3 shows 11% of Thai farm households reported reliance 
on informal credit markets, with 4% reporting that they depend solely on informal 
credit.   78% of farm households reported access to formal credit, while 71% reported 
that they solely depend on formal credit.  7% of farm households depend on both 
sources, and 18% reported being debt-free.  The Pearson Chi-squared and corrected F-
test shows significant association between households with formal and informal debt 
access, (see Table 4). 
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Table 2 Statistical Summary of key variables 
  Full Sample 
No 
Existing 
Debts 
Existing Debts   New Debts 
Formal Informal   Formal Informal 
Number of 
Observations 6,390 1,310 4,839 672  272 196 
Value of Existing Debt 
(in Thousand Baht) 96 0 98 115  128 118 
Value of Formal Debt 
(in Thousand Baht) 72 0 92 56  125 86 
Value of Informal Debt 
(in Thousand Baht) 7 0 6 59  3 30 
Monthly HH 
Income/capita (in Baht) 4,261 5,619 4,014 2,318  3,554 1,615 
Monthly HH 
Expense/capita (in 
Baht) 
3,738 4,585 3,565 3,170  4,017 2,390 
Head Age 52 56 51 49  51 47 
Family Size 3.64 3.32 3.71 3.78  3.86 3.92 
Dependency Ratio 0.56 0.60 0.55 0.65  0.56 0.71 
Owned Agricultural 
Land Size (in Rai) 16.7 13.5 17.6 15.5  17.8 12.8 
Rental Agricultural 
Land Size (in Rai) 5.1 2.2 6.1 8.8  8.9 11.5 
Public Agricultural 
Land Size (in Rai) 0.4 0.2 0.5 0.5  1.4 1.1 
Number of Female 
Head Households--% 20 26 19 25  17 23 
Number of households with head's education level.. (%)     
At least elementary 82 78 84 81  80 78 
At least high school 10 9 11 11  14 13 
At least college 7 13 6 8  5 9 
Percentage of households with other members' education level..(%)    
At least elementary 62 63 62 58  61 63 
At least high school 20 18 21 20  17 18 
At least college 15 17 14 18  17 15 
Percentage of  households with education level.. (%) 
At least elementary 68 68 68 66  66 66 
At least high school 17 15 18 16  17 16 
At least college 13 15 12 15  14 14 
  
Source: SES 2006  
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Table 3 Summary of key variables (continue) 
  Full Sample 
  No 
Existing 
Debts 
  Existing Debts   New Debts 
    Formal Informal   Formal Informal 
Percentage of households who have report having the following conditions. (%)  
 Medical Treatment 16  15  16 17  25 18 
 Disability 0*  0*  0* 0*  0* 0* 
 Financial Problems 8   5   8 16   13 20 
Percentage of households who live in the following area. (%)         
 
Bangkok and 
surrounding area 
(region 1) 0*  0*  0* 1  0* 1 
 Central (region 2) 14  16  13 19  8 20 
 North (region 3) 26  19  17 22  36 23 
 Northeastern (region 4) 46  38  48 41  38 45 
  South (region 5) 14   27   11 17   18 11 
Number of households surveyed in each month. (%) 
 Month 1 9  8  9 12  18 14 
 Month 2 9  9  9 10  20 8 
 Month 3 8  8  7 8  9 11 
 Month 4 9  11  8 6  16 6 
 Month 5 9  9  9 7  5 5 
 Month 6 7  6  8 6  5 9 
 Month 7 8  10  8 6  6 9 
 Month 8 8  8  8 5  3 7 
 Month 9 8  7  8 8  6 8 
 Month 10 8  6  8 11  4 8 
 Month 11 10  10  10 12  4 6 
  Month 12 7   8   7 9   4 8 
Number of Rice farming households in each region (compared with other households-- %) 
 
Bangkok and 
surrounding area 
(region 1) 0*  0*  0* 0*  0* 0* 
 Central (region 2) 6  5  6 8  2 9 
 North (region 3) 14  10  14 12  14 15 
 Northeastern (region 4  38  33  39 35  32 40 
  South (region 5) 1   1   1 2   1 1 
 
Source: SES 2006, 0* denotes less than 0.5% 
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Table 4 Percentage of farm households with debt 
Formal Informal Total 0 1 
0 18.03 3.91 21.94 
 (0.0084) (0.0037) (0.0081) 
    
1 70.89 7.18 78.06 
 (0.0074) (0.0021) (0.0081) 
    
Total 88.92 11.08 1 
  (0.0033) (0.0033)   
Pearson:       
  Uncorrected chi2(1) = 82.2587 
  Design-based F(1, 23) = 34.979 
Source: SES 2006 
Note: Standard errors are given in parentheses  
 
 
 
 
 
This model focuses on households choosing to participate in credit markets.  
Other households that do not want or need credit, and declared so in the survey, are 
excluded from the estimation.  This leaves us with households that answer can borrow/ 
borrow some/ and unable to borrow.  And since the model does not allow for 
households who borrowed both from formal and informal sources, 17 households are 
excluded out of 481 households that obtained new loans. 
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6 HYPOTHESES 
This section summarizes main testable hypotheses and corresponding parameters 
of interest.   
 
Hypothesis 1: Households whose loan demand could not be met in the formal sector 
were credit rationed in that sector and had to rely on informal loans to ﬁnance 
agricultural production.  
 
The theoretical view on coexistence of parallel credit market as a result of credit 
rationing in the formal sector was shared by Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), and empirically 
tested by Bell, Srinivasan, & Udry (1997), Kochar (1997), and Guirkinger (2006).  
The presence of credit rationing in the formal sector, illustrated by households holding 
existing loans from the informal sector, would increase probability of households’ 
borrowing again from informal sector.  On the contrary, the presence of households 
holding an existing formal loan demonstrates the households’ ability to borrow from 
the formal sector, and thus would increase probability of the households’ borrowing 
again from the same sector.  As a result of this, the coefficient for the existing 
informal loan should be positive and the coefficient for the existing formal loan should 
be negative for the probability of informal credit participation. 
 
Hypothesis 2: Less wealthy households are more likely to borrow, and are more likely 
to borrow from informal credit market than their wealthier peers. 
  
We are interested to see the net effect of income both as a factor determining 
the access to credit as well as a factor involving the formal/informal credit 
participation.  Since poor households are more likely to face consumption constrains, 
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and to rely more on credit markets, the probability of credit access should be higher 
for the households at lower level of wealth.  Nonetheless, the less wealthy households 
are also considered riskier, due to the lack of collaterals, and are more likely to face 
credit rationing from the formal sector and to rely more on the informal credit market.  
As a result, the coefficient on income should be negative for the probability of credit 
access but positive for the probability of informal credit participation. 
 
Hypothesis 3: Farm households tend to borrow before the planting season, and less 
during the harvesting season. 
 
In our data, households that grow rice make up 59% of total agricultural 
households and the majority of these households are located in northeastern region 
where they grow only one crop of rice per year due to lack of proper irrigation 
systems.   Rice productions require more working capital prior to the planting season 
to buy seeds, fertilizers, equipments, and machineries and less during the harvesting. 
Rice seeds are regularly planted following the dry season, mainly from May to June 
and harvested after the wet season, predominantly from October to December.  As a 
result, activities involving new credit should be higher between January and May.  
Accordingly, the coefficients on monthly dummy variables should be positive between 
January and May and negative from June to December for the probability of credit 
access. 
  
Hypothesis 4: The greater the amount of land, the more working capital households 
need, thus the more likely they are to borrow. 
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It is interesting to observe the effect of various types of land since the SES data 
provides us with three distinct types of land variables.  First the size of land suggests a 
level of working capital the households might need for farm operations.  In addition to 
this, the presence of land owned also suggests a possibility of land being used as 
collateral to acquire new loans from the formal credit sector.  Accordingly, the 
coefficient on owned land should be positive on the probability of accessing new 
credit, and negative on the probability of informal credit participation.  Additionally, 
the coefficients on both rental and public land should be positive on the probability of 
accessing new credit and positive on the probability of informal credit participation. 
 
7 RESULTS 
To show robustness of estimated parameters, results from four model 
specifications are offered in this section.  The first specification provides a baseline 
model in which the probability of access to credit is determined by household 
characteristics, land size, external shocks, region, and monthly dummy variables.  The 
probability of informal loan participation is determined by income, dummy variables 
for existing formal and informal loans, household characteristics, land size, and 
external shocks. 
 
The second specification preserves all of the baseline covariates and adds dummy 
variables for rice farming in each region to the set of explanatory variables for the 
probability of accessing credit.  Similar to the second specification, the third 
specification preserves all of the baseline covariates and adds dummy variables for 
rice farmers in each region to the set of explanatory variables for the probability of 
credit access.  It also adds monthly dummy variables to explain the determination of 
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the informal loan participation.  Finally the fourth specification incorporates dummy 
variables for rice farming in each region in both sets of explanatory variables of credit 
access and informal loan participation. 
 
7.1 PROBABILITY OF CREDIT ACCESS 
Table 5 and 6 report results from the determination of credit access equation.  
Results from the credit access stage show that negative and highly significant 
coefficients on income across all four models suggest that wealthier households are 
less likely to access new loans.  This is accentuated by the fact that, on average, 
increasing wealth substitutes the farmers’ need to access funding.  The positive and 
significant coefficient on family size indicates that households with higher numbers of 
family member are more likely to access new loans. 
 
The model also finds coefficients on rental farmland and public land positive and 
highly significant, suggesting that households that rented lands or use public lands are 
more likely to take new loans.  This result pinpoints the need for policymakers to 
monitor this particular risky group carefully, since rent payment can adversely affect 
the level of working capital and the longer-term viability of the farm’s operations. 
Accordingly, the positive and significant coefficients on rental and public land 
coincide with the prediction of the fourth hypothesis, that the greater the amount of 
land, the more likelihood there is of borrowing  due to more working capital required.  
Interestingly, the implication of the owned farmland remains unsolved. 
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Table 5 Parameters estimated from Access to Credit equation model I, II 
Dependent Variables: 
1{New loan}, 
0{otherwise} 
  Model (I)   Model (II) 
  
Coefficients 
Linearized 
Standard 
Errors 
  Coefficients 
Linearized 
Standard 
Errors 
Income  -0.000006*** 0.0000  -0.000006*** 0.0000 
Head of HH age  -0.0132 0.0125  -0.0149 0.0124 
Head of HH age square  0.000091 0.0001  0.00010 0.0001 
1{Head of HH is a 
female}  -0.0033 0.0609  -0.0037 0.0580 
Number of households with head's education level.. (%)    
 At least elementary  -0.0436 0.0908  0.0842 0.1299 
 At least high school     0.1167 0.1523 
 At least college  -0.1272 0.1537    
Family size  0.0458** 0.0204  0.0447** 0.0205 
Dependency ratio  0.0633 0.0428  0.0621 0.0442 
land size(owner)  -0.0014 0.0023  -0.0015 0.0023 
land2 (rental)  0.0049** 0.0019  0.0051** 0.0020 
land3 (public)  0.0144*** 0.0048  0.0143*** 0.0048 
Medical  0.1353* 0.0696  0.1328* 0.0686 
Disability  0.1283 0.5368  0.1399 0.5448 
Financial problems  0.3937*** 0.0908  0.3916*** 0.0929 
1{Region 2 - Central}  -0.0352 0.5184  0.0154 0.5360 
1{Region 3 - North}  0.1480 0.5157  0.1655 0.5323 
1{Region4 - Northeast}  -0.0039 0.5203  -0.1690 0.5292 
1{Region 5- South}  0.1902 0.5210  0.1571 0.5309 
1{Month 2}  0.0961 0.1407  0.0911 0.1328 
1{Month 3}  -0.1672 0.1184  -0.1509 0.1158 
1{Month 4}  -0.0460 0.0877  -0.0492 0.0853 
1{Month 5}  -0.4497** 0.2135  -0.4510** 0.2050 
1{Month 6}  -0.3308 0.2001  -0.3263 0.1981 
1{Month 7}  -0.3532** 0.1623  -0.3686** 0.1531 
1{Month 8}  -0.4940*** 0.1486  -0.4983*** 0.1357 
1{Month 9}  -0.3026** 0.1277  -0.2974** 0.1253 
1{Month 10}  -0.4345*** 0.1505  -0.4389*** 0.1444 
1{Month 11}  -0.5426*** 0.1046  -0.5472*** 0.0972 
1{Month 12}  -0.4466*** 0.1408  -0.4596*** 0.1440 
1{rice farming*region 2}     -0.2637* 0.1364 
1{rice farming*region 3}     -0.1391 0.0919 
1{rice farming*region 4}     0.1353* 0.0699 
1{rice farming*region 5}     -0.1551 0.1805 
_cons   -1.0429* 0.5864   -1.0663* 0.5853 
*,**,*** denote 10%, 5%, and 1%  level of significance 
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Table 6 Parameters estimated from Access to Credit equation model III, IV 
Dependent Variables: 
1{New loan}, 
0{otherwise} 
Model (III)   Model (IV) 
Coefficients 
Linearized 
Standard 
Errors   
Coefficients 
Linearized 
Standard 
Errors 
Income -0.000006*** 0.0000  -0.000006*** 2.00E-06 
Head of HH age -0.0168 0.0128  -0.0157 0.0125 
Head of HH age square 0.0001 0.0001  0.0001 0.0001 
1{Head of HH is a 
female} -0.0044 0.0608  0.0001 0.0597 
Number of households with head's education level.. (%)   
 At least elementary 0.0765 0.1268  0.0675 0.1270 
 At least high school 0.1113 0.1529  0.1042 0.1524 
 At least college      
Family size 0.0448** 0.0205  0.0439** 0.0210 
Dependency ratio 0.0586 0.0433  0.0583 0.0437 
land size(owner) -0.0015 0.0023  -0.0014 0.0023 
land2 (rental) 0.0051** 0.0020  0.0051** 0.0020 
land3 (public) 0.0149*** 0.0049  0.0148*** 0.0048 
Medical 0.1392** 0.0669  0.1393** 0.0692 
Disability 0.1626 0.5460  0.1685 0.5373 
Financial problems 0.3862*** 0.0867  0.3852*** 0.0913 
1{Region 2 - Central} 0.0010 0.5396  -0.0251 0.5357 
1{Region 3 - North} 0.1544 0.5394  0.1403 0.5320 
1{Region4 - Northeast} -0.1607 0.5352  -0.2023 0.5296 
1{Region 5- South} 0.1464 0.5365  0.1334 0.5312 
1{Month 2} 0.0001 0.1290  0.0922 0.1334 
1{Month 3} -0.1471 0.1327  -0.1423 0.1142 
1{Month 4} -0.1282 0.0968  -0.0474 0.0884 
1{Month 5} -0.5791** 0.2155  -0.4521** 0.2150 
1{Month 6} -0.3140 0.2198  -0.3277 0.1939 
1{Month 7} -0.3540** 0.1410  -0.3629** 0.1524 
1{Month 8} -0.5705*** 0.1538  -0.5233*** 0.1333 
1{Month 9} -0.3274** 0.1187  -0.3083** 0.1271 
1{Month 10} -0.4405*** 0.1445  -0.4328** 0.1544 
1{Month 11} -0.6167*** 0.1181  -0.5545*** 0.1028 
1{Month 12} -0.4028** 0.1564  -0.4547*** 0.1481 
1{rice farming*region 2} -0.2462* 0.1358  -0.1077 0.1819 
1{rice farming*region 3} -0.1416 0.0977  -0.1107 0.1102 
1{rice farming*region 4} 0.1259 0.0736  0.2081* 0.0866 
1{rice farming*region 5} -0.1444 0.1916  -0.1275 0.2665 
_cons -0.9587 0.5860   -1.0266* 0.5862 
      
 
*,**,*** denote 10%, 5%, and 1%  level of significance 
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Negative and significant coefficients from May through December reveal that farm 
households are less likely to borrow during the planting and harvesting season.  While 
the timing of credit access coincides with the prediction of the third hypothesis, it may 
also highlight the limited role of BAAC to support agricultural production loans and 
not to offer consumption-based loans.  The estimation finds positive and significant 
coefficients on medical and financial shocks suggesting households faced with 
existing medical and financial problems are more likely to take new loans.  Negative 
and significant coefficients on rice farmers of the central and northeastern region 
suggest less probability of these farmers to credit access.   
 
7.2 PROBABILITY OF INFORMAL LOAN PARTICIPATION 
Table 7 and 8 show results from probability of an informal-formal loan 
participation equation.  Households choose to participate in either formal or informal 
loans. Thus an increase in probability of informal loan participation implies a decrease 
in probability of formal loan participation. 
 
In this outcome stage, the estimation finds strong evidence to support the first 
hypothesis, “Households whose loan demand could not be met in the formal sector 
were credit rationed in that sector and had to rely on informal loans to ﬁnance 
agricultural production. The presence of credit rationing in the formal sector, 
illustrated by households holding existing loans from the informal sector, increases 
probability of households’ borrowing again from the same sector as shown by positive 
and highly significant coefficient of existing informal loans.  It turns out that the 
opposite is also true, as the coefficient for the existing informal loan is positive and the 
coefficient for the existing formal loan is negative for the probability of informal 
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credit participation.  The presence of households holding existing formal loan 
demonstrates the households’ ability to borrow from the formal sector, and thus 
increases probability of the households’ borrowing again from the same sector.  The 
main application of this result is to predict the reoccurrences of loan sources based on 
previous, existing loan sources. 
 
 The estimation finds that higher income households are more likely to borrow 
from formal sources.  This, combined with the discussion in the previous subsection, 
gives us a general e result of the wealth effect, that wealthier households are less likely 
to borrow, and more likely to borrow from formal sources.  The opposite is also true, 
as wealthy households are more likely to borrow, and are more likely to borrow from 
the informal sources. The results coincide with prediction of the second hypothesis, 
“Less wealthy households are more likely to borrow, and are more likely to borrow 
from informal credit market than their wealthier peers.”. 
 
The estimation also finds that increases in family size positively affect the 
probability of informal credit participation.  Together with the result from the previous 
subsection, this highlights the importance of welfare policy aiming at farm households 
with more than one child as the larger a family, the more likelihood to borrow, and to 
borrow from informal credit source. 
 
Land ownership plays a defining role in determining the source of credit.  The 
estimation finds the coefficient of owned land size negative and significant, albeit at a 
10% level, suggesting that households with owned lands are more likely to participate 
in formal loans.  The positive and highly significant coefficient of rented land size 
produces strong evidence that households with rental land are more likely to borrow 
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from informal sources.  Combined with the previous subsection, these results 
underscore collateral requirements in the formal credit market and the lack thereof in 
the informal credit sector. 
 
Finally, the positive and significant coefficients on being a rice farmer in the 
central or northeastern region emphasize a likeliness of these farmers to borrow from 
the informal sources.  
 
The estimated 𝜌𝜌 reveals that the error terms in the two equations are closely 
linked.  The unobservable factor influencing the probability of credit access is also 
determining the probability of informal loan participation.  This result suggests that 
individual estimations would entail sample selection bias.  
 
  
  103 
 
Table 7 Parameters estimated from Formal/Informal Loan Participation 
equation model I, II 
Dependent Variables: 
1{inf}, 0{fml} 
  Model (I)   Model (II) 
  
Coefficients 
Linearized 
Standard 
Errors 
  Coefficients 
Linearized 
Standard 
Errors 
Income  -0.00001*** 0.0000  -0.00001*** 2.94E-06 
1{existing formal loan}  -0.7453*** 0.2617  -0.7005*** 0.2001 
1{existing informal loan}  0.7476*** 0.2056  0.7062*** 0.1494 
Number of households with head's education level.. (%)    
 At least elementary  0.0371 0.1588  0.0294 0.1499 
 At least high school  0.0978 0.2283  0.0952 0.2222 
Family size  0.0456** 0.0188  0.0465** 0.0177 
Dependency ratio  0.0941 0.0843  0.0924 0.0779 
land size(owner)  -0.0063* 0.0034  -0.0061* 0.0034 
land2 (rental)  0.0055*** 0.0009  0.0054*** 0.0009 
land3 (public)  0.0092 0.0071  0.0090 0.0067 
Medical  0.0311 0.1106  0.0312 0.1083 
Disability  -0.7736 0.5429  -0.7203 0.5278 
Financial problems  0.3981* 0.2293  0.3781 0.2325 
1{Month 2}       
1{Month 3}       
1{Month 4}       
1{Month 5}       
1{Month 6}       
1{Month 7}       
1{Month 8}       
1{Month 9}       
1{Month 10}       
1{Month 11}       
1{Month 12}       
1{rice farming*region 2}       
1{rice farming*region 3}       
1{rice farming*region 4}       
1{rice farming*region 5}       
_cons   -1.5563*** 0.2416   -1.5915*** 0.1918 
ρ   0.9704 0.0328   0.9787 0.0198 
Number of Observations  6211   6195  
Population size   3679000.2     3670866.5   
       
 
*,**,*** denote 10%, 5%, and 1%  level of significance 
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Table 8 Parameters estimated from Formal/Informal Loan Participation 
equation model III, IV 
Dependent Variables: 
1{inf}, 0{fml} 
Model (III)  Model (IV) 
Coefficients 
Linearized 
Standard 
Errors  
Coefficients 
Linearized 
Standard 
Errors 
Income -0.00001** 3.65E-06  -0.00001*** 2.68E-06 
1{existing formal loan} -0.9211*** 0.2643  -0.7664*** 0.2096 
1{existing informal loan} 0.8085*** 0.1503  0.7426*** 0.1468 
Number of households with head's education level.. (%)   
 At least elementary 0.0091 0.1345  0.0050 0.1340 
 At least high school 0.0742 0.2250  0.1171 0.2039 
Family size 0.0684** 0.0275  0.0513** 0.0192 
Dependency ratio 0.0793 0.0863  0.0515 0.0712 
land size(owner) -0.0066** 0.0032  -0.0059* 0.0034 
land2 (rental) 0.0055*** 0.0011  0.0047*** 0.0008 
land3 (public) 0.0107 0.0069  0.0114 0.0068 
Medical 0.0483 0.1189  0.0366 0.1106 
Disability -0.7112 0.4859  -0.6991 0.4925 
Financial problems 0.3771 0.2302  0.3504 0.2387 
1{Month 2} -0.4149** 0.1770    
1{Month 3} -0.0080 0.1957    
1{Month 4} -0.3276 0.2350    
1{Month 5} -0.4482*** 0.1175    
1{Month 6} 0.0110 0.3125    
1{Month 7} 0.0431 0.2071    
1{Month 8} -0.2324 0.3054    
1{Month 9} -0.1098 0.2116    
1{Month 10} -0.0245 0.2196    
1{Month 11} -0.1952 0.1919    
1{Month 12} 0.1323 0.1919    
1{rice farming*region 2}    0.4451** 0.2098 
1{rice farming*region 3}    0.1303 0.1588 
1{rice farming*region 4}    0.2375** 0.0973 
1{rice farming*region 5}    0.1178 0.2736 
_cons -1.3201*** 0.3062   -1.6448*** 0.2196 
ρ 0.9680 0.0330   0.9773 0.0209 
Number of Observations 6195   6195  
Population size 3670866.5     3670866.5   
 
*,**,*** denote 10%, 5%, and 1%  level of significance 
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7.3 GOODNESS OF FIT 
As measures of goodness-of-fit this section reports percentages correctly predicted 
to show how each model performs.   For each observation, predicted probability is 
calculated based on household covariates.  If predicted probability exceeds 0.5, we 
predict the outcome to be certain or unity.  If predicted probability is equal or less than 
0.5, we predict the outcome to be zero.  The percentage of times the predicted 
outcome matches the actual outcome is the percent correctly predicted.   The overall 
percent correctly predicted is the weighted average of the percent correctly predicted 
of each outcome {0,1}, with weight being the fraction of each outcome. 
 
Table 9 reports the comparison of percentages correctly predicted across four 
models with a high percentage of success in predicting no credit access outcome—
higher than 99%, while success in predicting access to credit is much lower.  
Nonetheless, conditional on actual credit access, success rates in predicting informal-
formal loan participation are higher than 60% in all cases.  The third and fourth 
specifications give the best results in terms of overall percentage correctly predicted, 
while the third specification yields the highest success rate in predicting new informal 
loans.  In light of this evidence, model three will be used to calculate marginal effects 
in the next section.  
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Table 9 Percent Correctly Predicted 
Percent Correctly Predicted Model I Model II Model III 
Model 
IV 
Success in predicting no new loan 99.9% 99.9% 99.9% 99.9% 
Success in predicting new loan 1.2% 1.2% 1.2% 1.2% 
Percent correctly predicted at credit 
access equation 92.4% 92.4% 92.4% 92.4% 
Population size 3679000 3670866 3670866 3670866 
     
Conditional on Actual new loan=1     
Success in predicting new formal loan 93.9% 95.3% 93.4% 94.3% 
Success in predicting new informal loan 63.9% 65.9% 69.4% 68.2% 
Percent correctly predicted at informal 
credit participation 80.8% 82.4% 82.9% 82.9% 
Population size 281484 280858 280858 280858 
     
Conditional on Predicted new loan=1 
Success in predicting new formal loan 38.1% 54.1% 46.1% 67.5% 
Success in predicting new informal loan 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Percent correctly predicted at informal 
credit participation 53.1% 65.2% 58.0% 75.4% 
Population size 5413 5413 5934 5413 
          
Source: Author’s calculation 
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7.4 MARGINAL EFFECTS 
In this section, predicted probability based on model (III) is calculated using 
household characteristics, land size, external shocks, region, monthly dummy 
variables, and dummy variables for rice farmers in each region to determine the 
probability of credit access.  The probability of informal loan participation is 
determined by income, dummy variables for existing formal and informal loans, 
household characteristics, land size, external shocks, and monthly dummy variables to 
explain the determination of the informal loan participation. 
 
   The average of calculated probabilities is then grouped by income quartile, 
month, and land ownership, and displayed in Table 9.  Based on the results, there are a 
few interesting observations. 
 
First, wealthier farmers are less likely to access new credit. However, when they 
do borrow, they are more likely to participate in formal credit.  Conditional on 
accessing new credit, the poorest farmers, indicated by being in the first income 
quartile, have 9 percentage points higher19 in probability to participate in informal 
credit compared to the richest farmers (fourth income quartile). 
 
Secondly, the probability to access new credit starts off higher in the beginning of 
the year, then slowly declines while participation in informal credit, conditional on 
participating in new credit, rises toward the end of the year.  This indicates that while 
overall access to new credit declines, people who need credit tend to participate in 
informal credit more as months pass. The probability difference between May and 
                                                 
19 50% versus 40.9% 
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December is, markedly, 27.7 percentage points.20  This striking evidence raises 
questions about the diminished role of formal credit institutions in the latter part of the 
year. 
 
Third, farmers who own land show the lowest probability of accessing new credit, 
while farmers who both own and rent land, or rent land only, show higher probability 
of accessing new credit.  Among the four groups, farmers who do not own but use 
public land show the highest probability of accessing new credit.  Conditional 
probability of participation in informal credit is highest among farmers who rent and 
do not own land, followed closely by farmers who rely on public land only.  In both 
cases, the probability is higher than 50%, indicating they are more likely to borrow 
from informal credit sources.  Farmers who both rent and own some lands appear to 
have the lowest conditional probability to participate in informal credit. 
 
 
                                                 
20 68.1% in December versus 40.4% in May. 
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Table 10 Predicted probability based on households' characteristics 
Marginal Effect P(new debt=1) P(inf=1) P(inf=1|new debt=1) 
1st income quartile 8.4% 7.0% 50.0% 
2nd income quartile 7.8% 5.9% 47.5% 
3rd income quartile 7.2% 5.2% 47.1% 
4th income quartile 5.8% 3.7% 40.9% 
Jan 13.4% 8.6% 42.9% 
Feb 12.9% 3.6% 22.6% 
Mar 9.9% 6.9% 45.8% 
Apr 10.2% 3.8% 29.2% 
May 4.2% 3.0% 40.4% 
Jun 7.4% 7.0% 52.1% 
Jul 6.9% 7.5% 56.7% 
Aug 4.3% 4.1% 51.0% 
Sep 7.0% 5.7% 48.2% 
Oct 5.8% 6.8% 57.7% 
Nov 3.9% 5.4% 59.7% 
Dec 6.0% 9.0% 68.1% 
Owned land only 7.0% 5.5% 47.6% 
Owned and Rented 
land 8.8% 5.5% 43.2% 
Rented land 9.3% 9.0% 56.8% 
Public land only 12.8% 11.1% 53.6% 
 
Source: Author’s calculation 
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Figure 12 Average predicted probability based on income quartiles 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 13 Average predicted probability based on month 
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Figure 14 Predicted Probability based on land ownership 
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8 POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
From the previous section, it is clear that the degree of participation in the 
informal credit market for Thai farmers is still significant.  In particular, farmers’ 
increased participation in informal credit conditional on accessing new credit rising 
toward the end of the year is the most worrisome discovery.  This piece of evidence 
pinpoints the limited role of BAAC in providing working capital only and not 
consumption-based loans hence underlining the importance of the lack of formal credit 
facility for farmers, and should be addressed quickly.  A policy response, perhaps 
together with BAAC’s loan allocation and other social safety net programs, to boost 
the role of formal credit channels through other and lower farm operation and 
household expenses should be considered. 
  
Secondly, level of wealth plays a significant role in determining both the 
probability of accessing to credit, and probability of participating in either formal or 
informal credit markets.  Table 9 shows that conditional on accessing new credit, the 
poorest farmers have equal probability of participation in either formal or informal 
credit, while the richest farmers have 59% probability of participation in formal credit.  
This demonstrates room for improvement in participation rates of formal credit across 
the board.  A form of micro-finance lending, and other network-lending programs 
should be considered to boost the allocation of credits through formal channels more 
efficiently. A new innovative credit delivery system is also encouraged 
 
Third, land ownership is crucial to accessing new credit.  What is interesting is 
that farmers who own and rent land at the same time have a higher probability of 
accessing new credit but lower conditional probability for participating in the informal 
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credit market.  This may indicate the use of owned land as collateral to participate in 
formal credit channels.  Without land ownership, the probability indicates that 
participation in the informal credit market is more than 50%.  The policy discussion 
should focus on working with the BAAC to establish a framework that will allow 
farmers to maintain land ownership. 
 
9 CONCLUSION 
Using the 2006 Socio-Economic Household Survey of Thailand, this study 
utilizes Heckman’s style selection model to determine loan participation of Thai 
agricultural households.  The result from this model provides supporting evidence that, 
facing credit rationing, households are more likely to ‘stick’ to the credit market they 
previously engaged in, whether the formal or informal credit market.  This finding 
reinforces the vicious cycle which makes it more difficult for farmers to get out of 
debt.  Secondly, the study finds supporting evidence that wealthier households are less 
likely to access credit, but, if they do, they are more likely to participate in formal 
credits, and the opposite is true of less wealthy households.   Thirdly, the study finds 
supporting evidence for less credit participation during May and December coinciding 
with the planting and harvesting season.   Specifically, the probability for accessing 
new credit starts off high in the beginning of the year then slowly declines while 
participation in informal credit, conditional on participating in new credit, rises toward 
the end of the year.  Alarmingly, this indicates that, while overall access to new credit 
declines, people who need credit tend to participate in informal credit more as months 
pass.  This piece of evidence pinpoints the limited role of BAAC in providing working 
capital only and not consumption-based loans underlining the importance of the lack 
of formal credit facility for farmers, and should be addressed quickly.  Finally, the 
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model finds that households with owned farmland are more likely to participate in the 
formal credit market, while households with rented farmland are more likely to 
participate in the informal credit market stressing the use of owned land as collateral 
to participate in formal credit channels.   
 
Future work can incorporate characteristics of informal lenders in order to model 
the behavior of suppliers of informal credit, although such data is extremely difficult 
to find.  The inclusion of reliable and comprehensive interest rate data will also benefit 
discussion of cost-benefit analysis of formal and informal credit, such as the 
calculation of risk premium based on households’ characteristics. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
ON THE CHALLENGE OF TESTING WEAK-FORM MARKET EFFICIENCY 
USING HIGH FREQUENCY DATA 
 
1 INTRODUCTION 
The increased availability of high frequency intraday trading data has made it 
possible for researchers to explore the microstructure of financial markets. Due to the 
sheer quantity of data and limited ability to manipulate and control for inherent errors, 
and outliers, the data-cleaning procedure of the high-frequency or intraday dataset 
becomes one of the most difficult tasks microstructure researchers face.  Lacking the 
appropriate treatment to screen the data, subsequent analyses based on it are at high 
risk of misrepresentation. To demonstrate the magnitude to which such 
misrepresentation can grow, this paper shows that running a simple technical trading 
strategy on improperly treated data can generate excess profits which are large, 
significant, and robust.  While this could be misinterpreted as another refutation of the 
Weak Form Efficient Market Hypothesis (Fama, 1970), this paper shows that more 
stringent data cleaning measures also eliminate these profits.  
 
To begin, Joel Hasbrouck, a finance professor at New York University and a key 
pioneer in the use of the Trade And Quotes dataset (TAQ), in a 2003 article in the 
Journal of Finance (Hasbrouck, 2003), presented a “$0.5 filter” treatment to clean 
TAQ data for a relatively new class of security called the Exchange Traded Fund, or 
the ETF of the S&P 500 (SPDR).  We show that the method implemented by 
Hasbrouck (2003) does not remove enough mistakes and outliers to be reliable.  This 
  118 
is critical as we find that a simple technical trading strategy yields spectacularly 
abnormal returns when the data used is filtered with Hasbrouck’s $0.5 filter.  
However, when a more conservative filter is applied, these abnormal profits go away.  
We further show precisely how the profitability of this simple strategy is dependent on 
the filtering criteria. If one believes that the S&P 500 ETF is weak form efficient, that 
the current price fully reflects all available information, then a simple technical 
strategy based on past price patterns should not yield abnormal returns. Thus, the fact 
that data cleaned by Hasbrouck’s filter yields abnormal returns is evidence that this 
filter is not appropriate for testing weak form market efficiency. This filter is simply 
too lax or too wide. We also provide graphic evidence that clearly identifiable outliers 
and mistakes are still visible on the charts of prices that were filtered with the 
Hasbrouck (2003) filter. However, these outliers are removed when we use a more 
appropriately stringent filter. These findings cast a shadow on all papers that have 
already used the Hasbrouck (2003) filter. They also represent a cautionary tale for 
researchers who are interested in testing the weak form efficiency of high frequency 
prices.  
 
Following Hasbrouck (2003), this paper uses the S&P 500 ETF as its main 
vehicle of study.  From its inception in 1993, investment in Exchange-Traded Funds, 
or ETFs, has been associated with low cost and highly diversified investment.  ETFs 
were created to provide retail investors opportunities to purchase a single security 
representing diversified baskets of stocks, similar to an index itself.  Accordingly, the 
SPDR trust contains the same proportionate weighting of all common stocks that 
comprise Standard and Poor’s 500 Composite Price Index.  In addition to being the 
first of its kind and having the longest price record of all ETFs, the SPDR is also the 
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most traded ETF to date.  The SPDR’s success has led to the establishment of many 
similar index products.   
 
The Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH) (Fama, 1970) conjectures a price 
sequence for a security following a sub-martingale with respect to the available 
information set, with a main implication that patterns in market prices cannot be 
reliably used to make greater expected profits than a buy-and-hold strategy.  Three 
sufficient but not necessary conditions to achieve frictionless market efficiency are i) 
zero transaction costs in trading securities, ii) all available information is accessible 
without cost to all market participants, and iii) all agree on the implications of current 
information for current price and distributions of future prices of each security.  
Accordingly, empirical work that demonstrates profitability of trading system that can 
outperform the buy-and-hold strategy is a direct evidence against market efficiency. 
 
Even before Fama’s (1970) paper gained momentum, there were attempts to test 
this weak form market hypothesis. To mention an important few, Alexander (1961, 
1964) implemented a trading system on Standard & Poor’s Industrials, the Dow Jones 
Industrial Average using daily data during 1928-61. Alexander’s filter rule gives a buy 
signal if the price has risen x% from the most recent bottom, and gives a sell signal 
when the price has dropped x% from the most recent peak.  This is seen today as a 
momentum strategy.  Alexander’s result was positive out-performance, compared to 
the buy-and-hold (B&H) strategy, but profitability was significantly reduced when a 
transaction cost of 2% for each round-trip was included. Fama and Blume (1966) 
repeated Alexander’s (1964) results and found only three small filter rules21, 0.5, 1, 
                                                 
21 This filter rules trading algorithm is not to be confused with the filtering technique this study uses to 
clean data. 
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and 1.5%, which yielded higher gross average returns of 11.4%-20.9% per year per 
security.  However after transaction costs were included, the returns became similar to 
buy-and-hold returns.  While early empirical results seem to support weak form 
market efficiency, more recent attempts that employ advanced econometrics methods 
and intraday dataset yield mixed results.  Farrell and Olszewski (1993) used a 
nonlinear trading strategy based on the Autoregressive Moving Average (1,1) model 
on daily data which includes a 0.024% transaction cost per round-trip on S&P 500 
futures.  The result was slightly more profitable than the B&H strategy, but 
statistically insignificant.  Levich and Thomas (1993) applied filter rules and a moving 
average strategy on daily International Monetary Market (IMM) currency futures 
during 1976-1990 with 0.025% and 0.04% transaction costs per one-way.  They found 
that their filter rules and moving average rule generated substantial positive mean net 
returns for all currencies but the Canadian dollar. And, for both trading systems, the 
null hypothesis that there is no information in the original time series was rejected in 
25 of 30 cases.  A more exhaustive review of the literature involving technical trading 
can be found in Park and Irwin (2004). 
 
Back to the study related to ETF, Hasbrouck (2003) studied price discovery 
among floor-traded index futures contracts, exchange-traded funds (ETFs), 
electronically traded, small denomination futures contracts (E-minis), and sector 
ETFs. Using a Vector Error Correction Model (VECM), he found that prices among 
ETFs, E-minis, and futures contracts in the S&P 500 Index converge rapidly within a 
five to ten minute window after a shock for each security.  The evidence of these small 
windows led to the conclusion that a high degree of substitutability exists among these 
‘similar’ products and that prices react quickly to offset any arbitrage opportunity.  
This finding also casually supports market efficiency. 
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In summary, the main contributions of this paper are three fold. First, the analysis 
shows that the profitability of a simple technical trading strategy depends critically on 
filtering the data. Secondly, the analysis shows that the wider 50 cent filter of 
Hasbrouck (2003) is not appropriate to use because it leaves in too many outliers and 
mistakes. This point is not apparent in early research since the availability of high 
frequency data is relatively limited.  In fact, using this data filter, the spectacularly 
positive out-performance for a simple technical strategy is everywhere. However, the 
positive region is not robust as we treat the data with lower filters of 0.3% and 0.2%.   
Third, all previously profitable strategies disappear with the 0.1% filter, the smallest 
filter we use, and the most appropriate, in my view. This shows that the 0.1% filter is 
not too wide. When risk is factored in, the buy-and-hold strategy remains superior to 
any of our technical trading strategies, and this result is robust across all three sub-
periods.  Having much of the profitability hinging on a wide filter level casts a shadow 
over the validity of results from studies that employed a wider band, such as 50 cents.  
 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows.  Discussion of data is given in the 
next section.  Section three describes transaction costs, trade algorithms, measures of 
performance, and the filtering method.  Section four presents results.  Section five 
concludes the study. 
2 DATA 
The main analysis in this paper uses price series of the S&P 500 ETF from the 
Trades and Quotes (TAQ) database, which contains high frequency intraday 
transaction data (trades and quotes) for all securities listed on the New York Stock 
Exchange, American Stock Exchange and NASDAQ.  From the TAQ dataset, second-
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by-second price series of an ETF of the S&P 500 were created for the regular floor 
trading session, from 9:30 am to 4:00 pm, for the period between January 29, 1993 
and December 31, 2006.  To reflect an actual “real-time” trading data set, or second by 
second data, this study aggregates the trade transactions of the same second and 
calculates the weighted average price of that second as well as filling-in any missing 
seconds with the previous active price traded.  
 
This study focuses on the issue of eliminating mistakes and outliers in the TAQ 
dataset since TAQ is notorious for containing a high number of erroneous transactions. 
Many filtering criteria will be examined in this study. First, a filtering method 
proposed in Hasbrouck (2003) is used. It is aimed at removing exchange-identified 
erroneous trades as well as any outlier trades that differ by more than 50 cents from a 
centered moving average over the nearest 10 second prices. The Hasbrouck (2003) 
 
  
Figure 1 S&P 500 ETF price and average trade volume 
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technique of filtering TAQ with a fixed 50 cent band during April and May of 2003 is 
equivalent to a 0.35% filter. As this turns out to have considerable impact on the 
results, this analysis will elaborate further on the filtering technique in section (4.1). A 
different result after adjusting the data with a new filtering treatment is offered in 
section (4.7). 
 
Benchmark monthly returns, which consist of holding period returns, value-
weighted portfolio returns, equal-weighted portfolio returns, and S&P 500 composite 
returns were obtained from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP).  The 
next section discusses the details of the trading strategy, including buying rules and 
selling rules.  
3 METHODOLOGY 
This section describes all components of the trading system underlying the 
analysis, starting with transaction costs in section (3.1) and (3.2), as vital elements in 
determining profitability of transactions.  Elaborations of mechanics in trading 
strategies are given in section (3.3) and (3.4).  Section (3.5) examines calculation of 
returns from the strategy.  Section (3.6) discusses risk-adjusted returns, or the Sharpe 
ratio.  Section (3.7) examines filtering techniques to clean TAQ data. 
 
3.1 ANALYSIS OF TRANSACTION COSTS 
Transaction costs play a crucial role in determining the real cost of trade.  This 
analysis breaks down transaction cost into two major components: 1) the Bid/Ask 
spread and 2) the brokerage commission fee. 
Trade prices, as opposed to quotes, are used in this study. Trade prices could result 
from a buyer initiated trade or from a seller initiated trade. This, however, is not 
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identified in the TAQ database. Therefore, there is a need to account for the bid/ask 
spread. When trade prices are used to buy and sell, there are 4 possibilities. First,  
i. Buy at a Bid price, and Sell at a Bid price: in such a case, the return is 
inflated by 1 spread. 
ii. Buy at a Bid price, and Sell at an Ask price, then the return is inflated by 2 
spreads. 
iii. Buy at an Ask price, and Sell at an Ask price; the return is inflated by 1 
spread. 
iv. Buy at an Ask price, and Sell at a Bid price. This is the correct case.  
Therefore, the return reflects actual value. 
 
Based on these possibilities, on average, one spread should be deducted from the 
round-trip profit of each transaction.  In addition, a fixed minimal commission of 2 
cents for each round-trip is used for transaction costs.  For a reality check, Interactive 
Brokers charges $0.01 for each transaction for each share. TD Ameritrade charges a 
flat fee of $10 per each trade. For trade of 1000 ETFs, commission per share = 
$10/1,000 = $0.01. 
 
A major event that directly impacts trading spread took place on January 29, 2001.  
The American Stock Exchange approved a decision to decimalize Exchange Traded 
Funds, for which the main implication is that quotes were to be reported in decimals 
instead of fractions, such as 1/32.  This decision has led to  more flexibility in trading 
and a more favorable trading environment, as the next section will show in more 
detail.  
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3.2 ANALYSIS OF BID/ASK SPREAD 
The analysis in this section is based on average daily spreads of the S&P 500 ETF 
derived from the CSRP.  Table 1 shows the evolution of the Bid/Ask spread’s basic 
statistics over the time period studied.  The distribution of the Bid/Ask spread is 
highly and positively skewed; thus, the analysis that follows renders mode as a 
representation of the spread distribution. An interpretation of means would be 
misleading, as they suffer from extreme price posting by market makers in later years.  
Analysis using medians is parallel to that for mode.  
 
Figure 2 shows that spreads were stable at around 3 cents in an absolute term from 
1993 to 1995.  But, from 1995 to 2000, the spread quickly rose from 3 cents to 25 
cents, an 833% increase while prices increased from 54.8 to 142.2, or a 259% 
increase, a far smaller change, over the same period.  The asymmetric increase in 
spread and price unveiled unique characteristics of this market microstructure, as 
quotes are trivially based on 1/32 price system.  
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At the height of the dot-com bubble in 2000-01, prices peaked and then began 
to drop sharply. As average prices dropped 14% in 2001 from 2000, the spread 
dropped from 25 to 8 cents, a 68% decrease over the same period. Although an 
asymmetric decrease could play a role this time, the decline in the spread is also 
likely to be partially driven by decimalization that took effect in January 2001.   
This became more evident when prices started rising again in 2004 but the spread 
went the opposite way, declining even further to only one cent.  Based on this 
finding, the decision to decimalize quotes has proven to be a productive measure 
for reducing transaction costs and smoothing market activities. 
 
Figure 3 shows spread as a percentage of price. The spread has varied from 
0.07% of price in 1993 to a height of 0.18% in 2000 and down to 0.01% between 
2004 and 2006. In our trading simulation, we allow the bid/ask spread to vary 
every year. 
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Figure 2 Modes of Bid/Ask Spread of SPDR from 1993 to 
2006 in ($USD) 
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Figure 3 Modes of Bid/Ask Spread of SPDR from 1993 to 2006 in 
(% of SPDR Price) 
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3.3 SIMPLE ALGORITHM 
This section describes the construction of a simple trading rule: selling when 
prices rise and buying back when prices drop.  The investor can hold cash and one 
security. Since the maximum number of securities is restricted to one unit, the investor 
can place a buy order again only after he closes his previous position.  And he will 
close this position only when a predetermined profit margin has been reached. 
Shorting is not allowed. 
 
Consider the price that an investor pays for the ETF is Pb, with a selling rule S = 
0.04%, a sell order will go through if there exists a price P such that, 
 
P ≥ (1+0.04%)Pb. 
 
Let us call this a selling price Ps.  Then the investor realizes the gain of Ps minus  
Pb and any costs associated with the trade.  Now, the investor is looking for another 
buying opportunity to long or add a position.  He will place another buy order when 
the current price is lower by a certain amount from the most recent price peak, defined 
as local maximum price between the last sell order and the execution of a new buy 
order. 
That is, for a price at time t, Pt, 
 
Pmax = Max(Pt-j , Pt-j+1 , …, Pt) 
 
Consider for a buying rule B = 0.05%, a buy order will go through if there occurs 
a price P such that, 
P ≤ (1-0.05%)Pmax. 
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This price becomes the buying price or Pb. 
The price peak is reset after a sell order is executed.  That is, following a new 
Ps, 
Pmax = Ps . 
Then another buying cycle begins with,  
Pmax = Max(Pt-j , Pt-j+1 , …, Pt). 
 
This investor is forced to close his open position by 4:00 pm on the last trading 
day of the month to make the comparison conform to a buy-and-hold strategy.  It 
should be noted at this point, following a successful buy order, that if the price never 
rises above the triggering point, the investor will hold the position regardless of how 
much unrealized losses have accumulated. He will never sell.  Usually investors have 
a different time frame for cash needs; in this case, the model assumes that the investor 
has the ability to withstand a long period of market downturn.  The first buy order is 
initiated arbitrarily at 10.30am, an hour after the opening of active trading hour, on 29 
January, 1993.    
 
To make this trading as close to reality as possible, this program also imposes 
special requirements that every buy and sell order needs to be executed on the price 
that has supporting market depth for the transaction to go through.  A graphic 
illustration is given in Figure 4.  
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3.4  ALGORITHM GRID 
The set of rules for buying and selling are from 0.05% to 2% for buying and 
from 0.04% to 2% for selling.  The full set of the buying and selling rules are given 
here: 
B = {0.05%,0.1%,0.15%,0.2%,0.25%,0.3%,0.5%,1%,1.5%,2%} 
and  
S = {0.04%,0.06%,0.08%,0.1%,0.12%,0.14%,0.16%,0.18%, 
0.2%,0.3%,0.4%,0.5%,0.6%,0.7%,0.8%,0.9%,1%,2%}. 
 
Altogether this gives us about 180 single strategies that account for each 
combination of buying and selling rules.  This paper restricts the upper-bound to 
2% to focus on the intraday trading window.  The range beyond 2% is left for 
future exploration. To simplify future notations, the following pattern is applied.  
Strategy (B,S) = (0.1%,0.5%) refers to the strategy that imposes a buying rule of 
0.1% drop from the previous nearest peak and a selling rule of 0.5% profit margin.   
With enough combinations, we will be able to draw a ‘region’ of performance, as 
well as determine the direction of higher performance. 
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Figure 4 Illustration of Trading Strategy (Bi, Sj). The gap between 
Buying and Selling Price reflects Profit Margin or Selling Rule.  The gap 
between the maximum price and the buying price reflects Buying Rule. 
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3.5 CALCULATION OF RETURNS 
A return is the change in the total value of an investment in a common stock 
over some period of time per dollar of initial investment. The benchmark monthly 
return series, or monthly returns of the buy-and-hold strategy (including dividends) is 
the difference of the current month’s closing price and the previous one plus a 
dividend then divided by the previous month’s closing price.  This series was obtained 
from the CRSP data.  The construction of this series is given below. 
 
For month t, let:  
t-1 = time of last month’s closing price 
R(t)(B&H) = return on purchase at t-1, sale at t 
P(t) = last sale price or closing bid/ask average at current month 
d(t) = cash adjustment for month t, usually a dividend 
P(t-1) = last sale price or closing bid/ask average at time of the previous month 
then, 
𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡(𝐵𝐵&𝐻𝐻) = 𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 + 𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡−1 − 1 
Next, monthly net returns of any particular combination of buying rule and 
selling rule (Bi, Sj), are created by summing all differences in buying and selling price 
from each round-trip transaction minus a spread and round trip commission fees, then 
divided by the buying price of that transaction, to make it more comparable to the 
benchmark return. 
 
For month t, let:  
R(t) (Bi,Sj) = return of the strategy (Bi,Sj) of month t 
  135 
n(t) = a round trip transaction n of month t 
Pbn(t) = ‘buying’ price of transaction n of month t 
Psn(t) = ‘selling’ price of transaction n of month t 
s(t) = spread between bid price and ask price of month t 
c = round trip commission fees 
then, 
𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡�𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖 , 𝑆𝑆𝑗𝑗 � = �𝑃𝑃𝑙𝑙(𝑡𝑡)𝑠𝑠 − 𝑃𝑃𝑙𝑙(𝑡𝑡)𝑏𝑏 − 𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡 − 𝑐𝑐𝑃𝑃𝑙𝑙(𝑡𝑡)𝑏𝑏𝑙𝑙  
Substituting Bi, and Sj with a different combination of buying rules and selling 
rules gives a unique algorithm that generates returns based on that particular 
combination. 
 
3.6 SHARPE RATIO 
This section analyzes the risk and return trade-off of the strategy (Bi,Sj) using an 
Ex Post Sharpe ratio that closely follows Sharpe (1994).  This performance measure 
uses historic data to determine the best investing strategy.  Validating this connection 
requires that historic results can be reconciled with future performance. 
 
From this construction, the Sharpe ratio measures the excess return from the 
strategy to rate of return from a risk-free asset, per unit of risk, or standard deviation.   
Let,  
t = Month t 
Rft = Rate of return from risk-free asset 
R t (Bi,Sj) = Rate of returns from strategy (Bi,Sj) in the month t 
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R(Bi,Sj)t – Rft = excess return in month t,  
𝐸𝐸�𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡�𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖 , 𝑆𝑆𝑗𝑗 � − 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡� = 1𝑇𝑇�(𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡�𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖 ,𝑆𝑆𝑗𝑗 � − 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡)𝑇𝑇
𝑡𝑡=1  
σD = standard deviation of the excess return 
𝜎𝜎𝐷𝐷 = �∑ ��𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡�𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖 , 𝑆𝑆𝑗𝑗 � − 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡� − 𝐸𝐸�𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡�𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖 ,𝑆𝑆𝑗𝑗 � − 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡��2𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡=1 𝑇𝑇 − 1  
then, an ex post, historic Sharpe Ratio is 
 
𝑆𝑆ℎ = 𝐸𝐸�𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡�𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖 ,𝑆𝑆𝑗𝑗 �−𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡�𝜎𝜎𝐷𝐷 . 
 
An increase in returns from algorithm (Bi,Sj) or decrease in standard deviation of 
excess return, will increase  the Sharpe ratio.  A higher Sharpe ratio suggests higher 
reward-to-risk strategy. 
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3.7 FILTERING TECHNIQUE 
TAQ data is notorious for containing mistakes and outliers, as shown in Figures 
14, 18, and 21.   To the naked eye, these outliers represent trading transactions that 
have large deviations from the main trend.  If these outliers are not treated 
appropriately, a computerized trading algorithm could potentially use these outliers 
and create an illusion of ‘unrealistic’ returns. 
 
 
Figure 5 Illustration of Filter Band around moving average 
 
This study examines filters based on narrower bands than that of Hasbrouck 
(2003). Here filters are studied that screen any price outlier that has 0.3%, 0.2%, or 
0.1% price deviation from the central moving average of the nearest 10 prices, or 11 
prices with the center price included.  A graphic example of how the band works is 
depicted in Figure 5.  The price series is plotted second by second.  And the outliers 
can be clearly seen at prices much higher than the price curve (isolated points). The 
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filter draws a band around the price curve (the 11 second moving average, to be 
precise). Then, any price that is outside of the band is labeled as erroneous and 
removed. 
  
To aid readers, and demonstrate how different levels of filter band can affect 
microstructure research, a graphic presentation of an actual filter-removed-outlier is 
given in Figures 14 to 17, Figure 18 to 21, and 22 to 25.  Three sets of daily prices on 
December 17, 2002, December 26, 2002, and May 11, 2005 show price movement and 
outliers removed from three different filters, starting with the most generous 0.3%, 
then 0.2%, and, finally, 0.1%.  For the following figures, an outlier that is identified by 
the filter will be marked by an “X” symbol.  The SPDR price series is represented by a 
circle symbol. 
 
Based on visual inspection of the scatter plots, it becomes obvious that the 0.3% 
filter does not adequately remove outliers.  However, a filter that is less than 0.1% is 
not investigated since the 0.1% filter removed the large majority of outliers and a 
narrower filter might remove too many valid observations. The 0.1% filter seems to be 
a more appropriate filter to ‘clean’ the TAQ data than that adopted by Hasbrouck 
(2003). The downside of our narrower filter is that during a high price volatility 
period, it could misidentify a ‘real’ price jump as an outlier.  Based on the evidence 
presented in this section, it is clear that Hasbrouck’s (2003) technique of filtering TAQ 
with a fixed 50 cent band during April and May of 2003, an equivalent of 0.35% 
Filter, might be too wide.  The next section will confirm this hypothesis. 
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Figure 6 SPDR Price without Filter 
 
Figure 7 SPDR Price with 0.3% Filter 
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Figure 8 SPDR Price with 0.2% Filter 
 
 
Figure 9 SPDR Price with 0.1% Filter 
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Figure 10 SPDR Price without Filter 
 
Figure 11 SPDR Price with 0.3% Filter 
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Figure 12 SPDR Price without 0.2% Filter 
 
Figure 13 SPDR Price with 0.1% Filter 
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  Figure 14 SPDR Price without Filter 
 
Figure 15 SPDR Price with 0.3% Filter 
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Figure 16 SPDR Price with 0.2% Filter 
 
Figure 17 SPDR Price with 0.1% Filter 
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4 RESULTS 
The main findings in this section are three-fold. First, the analysis shows that the 
profitability of a simple technical trading strategy depends critically on filtering of the 
data. Second, the analysis show that the wider 50 cent filter of Hasbrouck (2003) is not 
appropriate to use because it leaves in too many outliers and mistakes. In fact, using 
this data filter, this analysis found spectacularly positive out-performance for the 
simple technical strategy. However, the positive region is not robust when the data is 
treated with lower filters of 0.3% and 0.2%.  Third, all previously profitable strategies 
disappear with the 0.1% filter, the smallest filter we use, and the most appropriate, in 
our view. This shows that the 0.1% filter is not too wide. When risk is factored in, the 
buy-and-hold strategy remains superior to any of the technical trading strategies, and 
this result is robust across all three sub-periods. Having much of the profitability 
hinging on a wide filter level casts a shadow on the validity of results from studies that 
employed a wider band, such as 50 cents. 
 
The organization of this part is as follows. Section (4.1) visits returns and out-
performance based on the 50 cent (0.35%) filter in the three periods we study.  Section 
(4.1.1) to (4.1.5) analyzes a characteristic of a profitable strategy based on the 50 cent 
filter.  Section (4.2) re-visits returns and shows the disappearance of the out-
performance region as the lower filter criteria of 0.3%, 0.2%, and 0.1% are used. 
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4.1 RETURNS FROM THE 50 CENT (0.35%) FILTER 
The dynamic of transaction costs from section (2.2) suggests that further analysis 
should break the time studied into three periods, that is, 1993-1996, 1997-2001, and 
2002-2006.  Transaction costs have varied substantially among these sub-periods, both 
in terms of absolute value, as well as relative to price.   Breaking the analysis into 
three sub-periods will illustrate the importance of market structure for high-frequency 
trading strategies.    
 
Table 2 shows average annualized monthly net returns based on the 50 cent 
(0.35%) filter, and equivalents of 0.9%, 0.4%, 0.4% of average prices in the first, 
second, and third periods.  To interpret results from Table 2, the left heading is the 
range of buying rules, from a 0.05% drop from the most recent peak to 2% while the 
top heading is the range for selling rules, from a 0.04% profit margin to 2%.  
 
There are interesting implications to be drawn from these tables.  First, during 
1993-1996, the more profitable strategies are those with high selling rules or those that 
set high profit margins.  With the same profit margins, strategies with smaller 
retraction, or lower buying rules, tend to do better.  Hence, the top performers’ regions 
are those to the top right of the table.  The annualized net returns from each 
combination of buying and selling rules in this first period range from -21.28% to 
12.86%. 
 
In the second period (1997-2001), while higher profit margins or selling rules 
continued to generate higher profitability, larger retraction, or higher buying rules 
tended to generate better returns.  Thus, the top performer’s region shifts from the top 
right to the bottom right of the table.  Annualized net returns from each combination 
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of buying rules and selling rules in this second period range from -356.62% to 
13.72%.  The heavily negative returns region in the top left of the table reflects losses 
occurring from increases in transaction costs.  As the price of SPDR increases, the 
spread between bid and offer price also increases.  As was shown in section 2.1. This 
increase in transaction costs considerably penalizes strategies with low buying and 
selling rules. 
 
In the final period (2002-2006), the situation reverses again, and strategies that set 
lower profit margins turn out to be the most profitable this time. The region of top 
performers shifts from the bottom-right corner to the medium-left of the table. 
Annualized net returns from each combination of buying rules and selling rules in this 
first period ranged from 4.31% to 94.62%.  The marked increase in the profitability 
during this period was primarily driven by the decrease in the bid-ask spread. 
 
Now that the existence of a positive returns region in the sample is established, 
we shift the focus to comparing these returns from our trading rules (Bi,Sj) to the 
benchmark returns from the buy-and-hold strategy; as shown in Tables 3 and 4, it 
becomes immediately obvious that all of the strategies have underperformed the buy-
and-hold strategy in the first period, 1993-1996.  The grey color highlights the ‘over-
performance’ region.  And while three strategies have survived the performance test in 
the second period, 1997-2001, the sizes of out-performance were relatively small, only 
0.18%, 1.73%, and 2.17% based on annualized monthly returns.    
 
However, results during 2002-06 are different. The positive region, or the ‘out-
performance’, has surfaced across the ranges of the buying and selling rules.   The size 
of out-performance ranges from 0.03% to 87.49% over the buy-and-hold strategy, 
  148 
based on annualized net returns.  A close inspection reveals that the out-performance 
region includes strategies that set low profit margins, or selling rules, often lower than 
0.3%, and have retraction points, or buying rules, between 0.1% and 0.5% from the 
previous price peak.  However, before rushing to the conclusion that there is a true 
‘out-performance’ of the buy-and-hold strategy, and that the weak-form market 
efficiency can be rejected, it is proposed that these ‘abnormal’ returns are a product of 
not filtering the data appropriately for mistakes and outliers. It is asserted that the 50 
cent (0.35%) filter of Hasbrouck (2003) is too “wide.” 
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22 For this and following tables, darker shade of gray indicates higher profitable strategies. 
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4.1.1 Robustness Check 
Given the number of successful strategies in the final period, it is appropriate 
to continue to explore the robustness of the profitable strategies. This section will 
break down the final period into an additional two sub-periods.   
 
Table 5 compares returns from both sub-periods.  All of the strategies in the set 
have generated positive returns and are robust across the two periods.  The next table 
presents excess returns, that is returns from strategy (B,S) minus returns from strategy 
(B&H).  This gives the out-performance measure.  A broad observation suggests that 
the excess returns, or out-performance of strategy (B,S), tends to persist over the 
second period as well, although the out-performance region has somewhat contracted 
from the first sub-period, and the size of out-performance has reduced across the 
board. 
 
From the region of positive returns, one (typical) single strategy can be drawn 
out and analyzed in detail.  Figure 5 depicts the out-performance of strategy (0.25%, 
0.12%) from January 2002 to December 2006.   The break point for the two sub-
periods is July 1, 2004.    In the first sub-period, there were substantial excess-returns, 
many of which were larger than five percent on a monthly basis.  Another interesting 
observation is that these higher than usual excess returns concentrated on only market 
upturns.  In the second sub-period, although magnitudes were generally smaller, these 
excess returns continue to persist throughout the period.  There is no evidence of 
substantial excess returns, but consistent two to five percent excess returns are 
generally observed in this second period. 
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 Table 7 shows benchmark ex post Sharpe ratios during January 2002 and 
December 2006.  Table 8 shows ex post Sharpe ratios from strategy (Bi,Sj) during the 
same period.  The ex post Sharpe ratio that is based on the buy-and-hold returns 
during January 2004 and December 2006 is 0.10, implying 10% excess return to risk-
free asset per one unit of risk.  The gray region in Table 8 represents Sharpe’s ratios 
from strategy (Bi,Sj), which outperform this benchmark criterion.  
  
 
Figure 18  Monthly Over-Performance of Strategy 
(0.25%,0.12%) and SPDR Price during January 2002 and 
December 2006 
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 The interpretation of this gray region represents strategies with better reward to 
risk ratios compared to the buy-and-hold strategy.  In retrospect, this graphic 
representation is consistent with Table 4, suggesting that the out-performance of 
strategy (Bi,Sj) holds true even when risk is taken into account. 
  
4.1.2 Analysis of Selected Profitable Strategy from the 50 Cent Filter 
The analysis of the following section relies on monthly returns from strategy 
(B,S) =  (0.25%,0.12%) during 2002-2006.   
 
Table 9 Descriptive Statistics of the 
Monthly Returns of the Strategy and the 
Benchmark 
 
Source: compiled from Stata’s output 
Sixty month returns are compiled to create the distribution histogram in Figure 
6.  Broad observation suggests that the distinct feature of the R(B,S) lies in its right 
tail, which spans very far right, covering a more positive region of the returns than 
R(B&H).  This unique feature of R(B,S) allows its computed mean to be significantly 
larger than zero, and much higher than R(B&H).  Moreover, the left tail of the R(B,S) 
does not extend further than that of R(B&H). 
R(B,S) R(B&H)
Mean 0.0412       0.0057       
Standard Error 0.0089       0.0046       
Median 0.0302       0.0104       
Standard Deviation 0.0691       0.0355       
Sample Variance 0.0048       0.0013       
Kurtosis 1.2306       1.3860       
Skewness 0.8853       (0.5923)     
Range 0.3272       0.1893       
Minimum (0.0907)      (0.1047)     
Maximum 0.2365       0.0846       
Count 60              60             
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Figure 19 shows a large majority of dots on the left side of the 45 degree line, 
which indicates out-performance of the buy-and-hold strategy.  Figure 20-21 shows a 
large majority of dots above the x-axis, which indicates out-performance of the buy-
and-hold strategy.  The next section addresses analysis of this out-performance using 
the Capital Asset Pricing Model approach. 
 
Figure 19 Scatter Plot of R(B,S)=R(0.25%,0.12%) and 
R(B&H) with 45 degree line 
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Figure 21 Excess Returns of  (B,S)=(0.25%,0.12%) to R(B&H) 
with quadratic fitted curve 
y = 5.4397x2 + 0.6104x + 0.0252
R2 = 0.2516
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4.1.3 Risk Analysis Using CAPM 
To measure the degree to which systematic risk has an impact on the (B,S) 
strategy, this analysis employs tools from the popular Capital Asset Pricing Model 
(CAPM). 
First consider the following notations, 
 RF = Return from risk-free asset 
β(Bi,Sj)  = Systematic risk of strategy(Bi,Sj) 
R(Bi,Sj) = Returns of strategy (Bi,Sj) 
R(B&H) = Market returns, here similar to returns of strategy (B&H) of SPDR 
CAPM values the expected returns of strategy (Bi,Sj) as a combination of a 
return from risk-free asset and a product of its systematic risk and market risk 
premium.  Formally, 
 𝐸𝐸�𝑅𝑅�𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖 , 𝑆𝑆𝑗𝑗 �� = 𝑅𝑅𝐹𝐹 + �𝛽𝛽�𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖 ,𝑆𝑆𝑗𝑗 �[𝑅𝑅(𝐵𝐵&𝐻𝐻) − 𝑅𝑅𝐹𝐹]� (1) 
where β(Bi,Sj) is the beta coefficient from a time series regression of R(Bi,Sj) on 
market risk premium.  From (1), it can be interpreted that the required return on 
strategy (Bi,Sj)  is a linear function of excess market returns. 
Re-arrange the terms in (1) with an intercept term. 
 
 𝐸𝐸�𝑅𝑅�𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖 , 𝑆𝑆𝑗𝑗 �� − 𝑅𝑅𝐹𝐹 =  𝛼𝛼 + �𝛽𝛽�𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖 ,𝑆𝑆𝑗𝑗 �[𝑅𝑅(𝐵𝐵&𝐻𝐻) − 𝑅𝑅𝐹𝐹]� (2) 
 
If CAPM holds, then a regression of (R(Bi,Sj) - RF) on (R(B&H)  – RF) will 
yield an intercept (α) of zero. Any alpha larger than zero implies that the strategy is 
returning more than is required from it, given its level of systematic risk. In other 
words, alpha is the additional return unaccounted for by the CAPM. 
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Since R(Bi,Sj) and  R(B&H) are known from the last section, and we obtain risk 
free rates from the 3-Month U.S. Treasury bill, equation (2) can be regressed to 
determine if there exists such an α term,  Here, the analysis continues to use strategy 
(B,S)=(0.25%,0.12%) during 2002-2006.   
 
 
Table 10 OLS regression analysis of CAPM 
Dependent Variable:  R(0.25%,0.12%) - Rf 
Constant (Alpha) 0.03342** 
 
(0.00538) 
  Returns on B&H - Rf 1.57392** 
 
(0.15212) 
  Adj-R2 0.64 
Observations 60 
Note: ** denotes 1% significance level 
Standard errors are given in parentheses. 
 
 
The estimated systematic risk coefficient (beta) is 1.57, and significantly 
different from one.  This shows that returns from the (B,S)=(0.25%,0.12%) strategy 
are more variable than market returns.  The estimated alpha is positive and highly 
significant, as well.  This indicates that the strategy yields returns superior to its 
systematic risk prediction.  The size of the alpha also implies additional 3.3% more 
monthly returns from the strategy than otherwise anticipated. In annualized terms, this 
alpha represents over 40% additional returns.  A graphic representation of equation (1) 
is presented in figure 9, below. 
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Figure 22 Scatter Plot of Excess R(B,S)=R(0.25%,0.12%) to 
Rf and Excess R(B&H) to Rf with Plotted Linear Regression 
line 
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4.1.4 Downside versus Upside Beta  
The discovery of a beta larger than one should not come as a surprise when we 
recall Figure 6 (distribution of returns from the strategy versus the market). The right 
tail of the distribution of the strategy’s returns was much fatter than that of the 
benchmark buy-and-hold returns. On the other hand, the left tail of the strategy was 
not fatter. This suggests that the strategy’s returns are higher than those of the buy-
and-hold when the market is up but not necessarily lower when the market is down. 
Therefore, we suspect that beta (systematic risk) is not the same across positive and 
negative returns. This section addresses asymmetric systematic risk in R(Bi,Sj) by 
allowing the beta to be different during positive and negative market returns. This is 
implemented by the introduction of a dummy variable for negative market returns. The 
specification is the following form 
 𝑅𝑅�𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖 , 𝑆𝑆𝑗𝑗 � − 𝑅𝑅𝐹𝐹 = 𝛼𝛼 + �𝛽𝛽�𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖 ,𝑆𝑆𝑗𝑗 �𝑑𝑑 𝐷𝐷[𝑅𝑅(𝐵𝐵&𝐻𝐻) − 𝑅𝑅𝐹𝐹]� 
 + �𝛽𝛽�𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖 ,𝑆𝑆𝑗𝑗 �𝑑𝑑 (1 − 𝐷𝐷)[𝑅𝑅(𝐵𝐵&𝐻𝐻) − 𝑅𝑅𝐹𝐹]� + 𝜀𝜀 (3) 
 where RF  represents return from risk-free asset, R(Bi,Sj) denotes returns of 
strategy (Bi,Sj). R(B&H) is market returns, here similar to returns of strategy (B&H) of 
SPDR. D is a dummy variable for the ‘downside’, 1 if R(B&H)-Rf <0. βd(Bi,Sj)  
represents ‘downside’ systematic risk of strategy(Bi,Sj) and βu(Bi,Sj) represents ‘ upside’ 
systematic risk of strategy(Bi,Sj).  α denotes additional return unaccounted for in 
CAPM.   
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Table 11  OLS Regression Analysis of CAPM 
  
Dependent Variable:  R(0.25%,0.12%) - Rf 
Constant (Alpha) 0.02286** 
 
(0.00799) 
  [Returns on B&H - Rf] if D=1 1.20311** 
 
(0.25792) 
  [Returns on B&H - Rf] if D=0 1.99576** 
 
(0.28200) 
  Adj-R2 0.66 
Observations 60 
Note: ** denotes 1% significance level 
Standard errors are given in parentheses 
 
 
Table 11 reports results from estimating (3) , shown as the systematic risk of 
R(B,S), when R(B&H)-Rf is negative, is 1.2, whereas  the systematic risk of R(B,S) 
when R(B&H)-Rf is positive is much higher, at 2.0. The downside βd(B,S) is 
statistically significantly larger than the upside βu(B,S) .  The structure of this 
asymmetric beta has favored the R(B,S) to achieve much higher returns when the 
market is in an uptrend and also limit the volatility of negative returns when the 
market is in a downtrend.  A graphic representation of equation II is shown in Figure 
23.  Figure 24 shows a more flexible functional form between R(B,S) and the return on 
the index. This further confirms the above result. 
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Figure 23 Scatter Plot of Excess R(B,S)=R(0.25%,0.12%) and Excess 
R(B&H) with Asymmetric Beta 
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Figure 24 Scatter Plot of Excess R(B,S)=R(0.25%,0.12%) and Excess 
R(B&H) with Quadratic Fit Curve 
y = 5.4951x2 + 1.6369x + 0.0263
R2 = 0.6768
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4.1.5 Duration of a Trade and Proportion of time in the Market 
This section is devoted to the analysis of the proportion of time the strategy 
holds a long position (in the market) versus not holding a position (out of the market). 
The impact of this on returns is further analyzed. The analysis in this section relies on 
(B,S) =  (0.25%,0.12%) during 2002-2006.   
 
Table 12 Descriptive Statistics  of Monthly Transactions 
and Average Holding time from 2002-2006 
 
Source: compiled from Stata’s output 
  
An average holding time measures a period of time between a buy and sell 
order, or how long a position is open, or on the market.  An average idle time 
measures a period of time between a sell order and a new buy order, or how long an 
investor holds no position, or is out of the market. Based on Table 12, on average, 
investors trading with the (B,S) =  (0.25%,0.12%) strategy would hold a position in 
78% of the time. 
 According to this construction, an increase in the frequency of transactions 
would increase the profitability of the strategy. The higher the frequency of 
No. of Transactions
Avg. Holding time / 
(Avg. Holding time + 
Avg. Idle time)
Mean 83.53                       0.7813                       
Standard Error 10.05                       0.0175                       
Median 61.00                       0.8021                       
Mode 18.00                       -- N/A --
Standard Deviation 77.85                       0.1359                       
Kurtosis 3.02                         0.1387                       
Skewness 1.79                         (0.8286)                      
Range 348                          0.5144                       
Minimum 4                              0.4515                       
Maximum 352                          0.9659                       
Count 60                            60
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transactions, the more favorable the price pattern is in that month.  A low frequency of 
transactions would indicate the opposite.  A low frequency of transactions should most 
likely occur when an investor is unable to close a position and gets stuck in a market 
downtrend. 
 
Table 13 OLS Regression Analysis of R(B,S) and Market Participation  
  
From Table 13, coefficients of both variables are highly significant.  The 
Coefficient of No. of Transactions has a positive sign, consistent with the prediction. 
Based on these estimates, one round-trip transaction, Buy and Sell, would increase 
monthly returns by 0.076 percentage points, or 0.91 in annualized terms.  The 
coefficient for the Avg. Holding time/ (Avg. Holding time + Avg. Idle time) is also 
significant and negative, revealing a tradeoff between staying in the market, or getting 
stuck in a price decline and missing out an opportunity to trade.  The estimated trade-
off implies that if an investor stays in the market for an additional 0.1 of the time, the 
Dependent Variable: Returns on (B,S)=(0.25%,0.12%)
Coefficients
Constant 0.04486*
0.02412
No. of Transactions (per month) 0.00076**
0.00005
Avg. Holding time /(Avg. Holding time + Avg. Idle time) -0.08617**
0.02897
Adj- R2 0.82
Observation 60
Number in italic is Standard Errors of the estimates
* indicates significant at 10% level
** indicates significant at 1% level
Avg. Holding time = Avg. time from Buy to Sell
Avg. Idle time = Avg. time from Sell to Buy 
  170 
monthly net returns will be 0.8 percentage points lower.  This model captures 0.82 of 
the variation in monthly net returns of the strategy (B,S) =  (0.25%,0.12%).   
 
Figure 25 Scatter Plot of Proportion of Time In the Market and 
R(B,S)=R(0.12%,0.25%) 
y = -0.1699x + 0.174
R2 = 0.1117
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4.2 RETURNS FROM THE 0.3%, 0.2% AND 0.1% FILTERS 
The previous subsections demonstrate the evidence that relies on Hasbrouck’s 
0.35% filter.  In this section, the more appropriate filtering criterion is applied, that is 
lower than Hasbrouck’s 0.35%.  Results are then presented to the effect that returns 
and out-performance are highly sensitive to changes in filtering level.  Hence, the 
decrease of area and size of returns due to lower filters will indicate that previous 
profitability stems from a trading mechanism that uses outliers, and not only legitimate 
prices.  
 
The same trading algorithm is re-run, and returns from each combination are 
compiled and displayed in tables 14 to 16.  Excess returns for the buy-and-hold 
strategy, using holding period returns with dividends as benchmarks are compiled into 
matrix tables 17 to 19.  The darker shade of gray implies higher profitability. 
 
Tables 14 to 16 show that the positive returns region shrinks in both area and size 
as narrower filters are adopted.  Area and size are proportionately reduced in all three 
studied periods.  This hints that outliers exist proportionately in all periods that are 
covered. 
 
Now when the focus is shifted to comparing returns from trading rules (Bi,Sj) to 
benchmark returns from the buy-and-hold strategy.  It is expected that the first and 
second period results to be similar or worse than those of section (3.1) due to the 
narrower filters we employ.  As expected, tables 17 to 19 show that all strategies from 
first and second period performed ‘poorer’ when compared to the buy-and-hold 
strategy.  In the third period, 2002-2006, the previous out-performance region also 
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decreases markedly, both in area and size, as there is a switch from the 0.3% to 0.2% 
filter, and completely vanishes when we use the 0.1% filter. Based on this specific 
trading algorithm and results in this section, no evidence can be found to reject Weak-
Form Market Efficiency. 
 
It is now apparent that with the 0.1% filter, the computerized trading algorithm 
cannot outperform the buy-and-hold strategy in terms of net returns.    Focus is again 
shifted in order to incorporate risk into the analysis of data with the 0.1% filter, to 
consider the case of return per unit of risk, or the Sharpe ratio.   
 
Table 21, below, shows the benchmark of ex post Sharpe ratios in all three 
periods that have been studied (the higher the number, the better reward-to-risk 
strategy).  The results turn out to be generally poorer when compared to the buy-and 
hold strategy’s, and the Sharpe ratios from the buy-and-hold strategy outperform all 
strategies (Bi,Sj) in all three periods.  It is therefore concluded that , even when risk 
from fluctuation of returns is factored in, the buy-and-hold strategy remains superior 
to returns from the computerized strategies.  A final point to note in this section is that 
some of the Sharpe ratios are even negative, implying that the strategies had a lower 
return compared to putting money in a risk-free asset (all three sub-periods).   
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Table 14 Returns table from 0.3% Filter23 
 
 
 
                                                 
23 For this and following tables, darker shade of gray indicates higher profitable strategies. 
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Table 15 Returns table from 0.2% Filter 
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Table 16 Returns table from 0.1% Filter 
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Table 17 Out-performance Region from 0.3% Filter 
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Table 18 Out-performance Region from 0.2% Filter 
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Table 19 Out-performance Region from 0.1% Filter 
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Table 20 Benchmark Ex Post Sharpe Ratios 
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Table 21 Ex Post Sharpe Ratios based on 0.1% Filter 
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5 CONCLUSION 
The first section discussed motivation, background, and the data source of this 
paper.  In reviewing the literature, most previous contributions suggest that trading 
strategies usually fail to outperform the buy-and-hold strategy after factoring in 
transaction costs.   
 
Data is discussed in section two.  Section three describes methodology by, first, 
addressing components within transaction costs, and, second, by analyzing the 
Bid/Ask Spread.  It is concluded that the spread component has varied widely 
throughout the period observed.  This finding leads to the decision to break the entire 
trading period into roughly three sub-periods with very different costs structures.  
Then, a detailed description of a simple technical trading algorithm, comprising a 
buying rule and a selling rule, is discussed; the calculation of returns is examined, 
ending section three with a discussion on risk-adjusted returns, and filtering technique. 
 
The main results in section four are threefold. First, it is shown that the 
profitability of a simple technical trading strategy is critically dependent on filtering of 
the data. Second, it is shown that the wider 50 cent filter of Hasbrouck (2003) is not 
appropriate to use because it leaves in too many outliers and mistakes. In fact, using 
this data filter, it was found to be spectacularly positive out-performance for the 
simple technical strategy. However, the positive region is not robust as the data is 
treated with narrower filters of 0.3% and 0.2%.  Third, all previously profitable 
strategies disappear with the 0.1% filter, the smallest filter used, and the most 
appropriate. This shows that the 0.1% filter is not too wide. When risk is factored in, 
the buy-and-hold strategy remains superior to any of the discussed technical trading 
strategies, and this result is robust across all three sub-periods. Having much of 
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profitability hinging on a wide filter level casts a shadow on the validity of results 
from studies that employ a wider band, such as 50 cents.  Short term weak form of  
market efficiency  can never really be tested when there is uncertainty as to what 
filtering criterion should be used.  A wide-filter, and a more conservative one lead to a 
completely opposite conclusions. 
 
There needs to be more research on the optimal filtering of the TAQ dataset and 
other ultra-high frequency datasets in general. It was clearly shown in this study that a 
widely used filter is not appropriate because it is too lax. However, it is not clear what 
level of stringency should be used for filtering intraday data. A narrow filter will 
remove outliers and mistakes. However, it will also remove valid prices.  This lies 
within the classical context of a trade-off between a type I error (removing a valid 
price) and a type II error (keeping an erroneous price). The appropriate trade-off 
should be examined.  Perhaps, more sophisticated filtering rules (than deviations from 
moving averages) should be explored to reach an optimal trade off.  
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